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Summary  findings
Randolph, Bogetic, and Heffley empirically study factors  spending increases initially, but decreases as population
that influence public investment in transportation  and  densities rise.
communication  infrastructure. Using pooled cross-  *  Central budget spending is positively associated with
national and time-series data for 1980-86  for 27 low-  improved institutional development, whereas
and middle-income economies, they assess the influence  consolidated budget spending falls as institutional
on public infrastructure spending of a government's  development improves (when levels of institutional
objectives (especially its commitment to poverty  development are low).
alleviation), the nature of the domestic economy, and the  *  The size of the budget deficit appears not to
flow (and composition) of external assistance. Their  influence central budget spending but is positively
findings:  associated with consolidated budget spending.
* Per capita spending on infrastructure responds most  *  Greater outward orientation  is positively associated
strongly to changes in the level of development, the  with increased consolidated budget spending but seems
urbanization rate, and the labor force participation rate.  to bear no relationship to central budget spending on
* Spending is greater in countries with large foreign  infrastructure.
sectors and is positively influenced by sectoral  *  Governments that are not committed to alleviating
imbalances between rural and urban areas (reflected in  poverty, or that are extremely committed to it, spend less
migration rates). Moreover, as the stock of infrastructure  from the central budget on infrastructure. Governments
increases, so does per capita spending on it.  with only limited commitment to alleviating poverty
D  If total flows of foreign savings increase, there is a  adopt strategies to increase the productivity of the poor
small positive response in per capita spending. The  by investing in infrastructure. But as their commitment
composition of foreign savings matters: when  intensifies, their strategy shifts to improving human
commercial bank flows represent proportionately  more  capital or strengthening the social safety net, and funding
of such flows, infrastructure spending is greater.  for those social programs competes with funding for
*  With higher population densities, consolidated  developing infrastructure.
government spending declines. Central government
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Public infrastructure investment  has the potential  to open new markets, lower private
production costs, reduce transaction costs, and increase competition. Recent studies
document  public infrastructure's stimulating  impact on private investment. Along side this
growing body of evidence substantiating  the importance  of public investment in infrastructure
for development  is an accumulation  of evidence  that infrastructure investment  in LDCs is
suboptimal. The primary objective  of this study is to isolate the factors influencing  public
infrastructure investment. Pooled cross-national  and time-series  data covering 27 low and
middle income economies  over the 1980-1986  period are utilized to assess the relative
influence  of the internal features of an economy, government  objectives, specifically  the
extent of commitment  to poverty alleviation,  and external assistance  on observed
infrastructure expenditures. Of particular relevance  to Bank operations is the estimated
influence  of the level of foreign assistance  and alternative  forms of foreign assistance (official
development  assistance, commercial  bank lending and direct foreign investment)  on
infrastructure expenditures.
The analytical  framework guiding the estimations  is a four-sector general equilibrium
model consisting  of urban households, urban producers, rural households  and a single
government. The model's solution  determines the optimal level and mix of public
expenditures  on infrastructure, human resources and consumption  public goods, and the
optimal mix of taxes on wages, domestic output and property.  The model generates a set of
reduced form equations for several forms of government  expenditures  and taxes.  The
reduced form equation for infrastructure  spending  provides the departure point for the
empirical analysis.  The determinants  of central government  expenditures  and consolidated
government  expenditures  are estimated separately. The internal features of the economy
considered include basic structural characteristics  of the economy, including the existing
stock of infrastructure, level of development,  population  density, urbanization, the rural-
urban balance, the labor force participation  rate, and institutional  development;  factors
reflecting macro balance and strategy orientation  including the size of the foreign sector, the
government's budget balance, the external balance, debt obligations, and commitment  to
poverty redress; and external factors including  terms of trade shifts, and foreign savings
flows.  Sensitivity  analyses are undertaken  to assess the robustness  of the results to
alternative definitions  of each of these factors.
Most of the findings regarding the determinants  of public infrastructure  expenditures
are broadly consistent regardless of whether central or consolidated  budget expenditures  are
the focus of concern. The main findings  are summarized  below.
(1) Per capita infrastructure expenditures  respond most strongly to changes in the
level of development, the urbanization  rate and the labor  force paricipation rate.  Elasticity
estimates for these factors are all above 1.0 in absolute value at the sample mean.  Of the
three factors, the labor force participation  rate has the strongest impact on infrastructure
expenditures.  Infrastructure expenditures  increase with the level of development,  as measured- ii  -
by GDP per capita. The relationship  is strictly linear if GDP per capita comparisons  are
made on the basis of purchasing  power parity conversions,  but in the central budget case,
infrastructure expenditures  increase at a decreasing  rate when exchange
rate conversions  are used.  Higher urbanization  and labor force participation  rates are
associated  with lower per capita infrastructure expenditures.
(2) The size of the foreign sector, the urban-rural  balance and the stock of
infrastructure are also important determinants of per capita infrastructure expenditure.
Per capita infrastructure expenditures  are greater in countries with a large foreign sector.
The size of the foreign sector is a more important  determinant  of central government
expenditures  than consolidated  budget expenditures, reflecting  the fact that export and
import taxes tend to accrue to the central government. A sectoral imbalance  between rural
and urban areas, as reflected  in migration  rates, positively influences  per capita infrastructure
expenditures. The relationship  is strictly linear in the case of central budget expenditures,
but dampens  off in the case of consolidated  budget expenditures. As the stock of
infrastructure increases, so do per capita infrastructure expenditures.
(3) Per capita infrastructure expenditures  respond  positively to increases in the
overaU  level of foreign savings  flows, but the magnitude of the response is small.  There is
an important qualification. The composition  of foreign savings matters; when commercial
bank flows are a high proportion of foreign savings flows, infrastructure expenditures  are
larger.  Also, as the share of direct foreign  investment  in total foreign savings increases,
infrastructure expenditures  initially  decrease, but subsequently  increase.  There is only weak
evidence that terms of trade shocks  and debt service obligations  significantly  influence  either
central or consolidated  budget expenditures,  although  the evidence is stronger for central
government  expenditures. The external (trade) balance does not have a significant  influence
on either central or consolidated  budget infrastructure  expenditures.
Several factors influence  central and consolidated  per capita infrastructure
expenditures  differently. Population density and institutional  development  are important
determinants  of both central and consolidated  budget  expenditures,  but the nature of the
relationship  differs.
(4) While higher population densities are strictly negatively  related to consolidated
infrastructure expenditures, central government expenditures  initially increase, but
subsequently decrease as population densities  rise.
(5) Central budget expenditures  are positively associated  with better institutional
development, but consolidated  budget expenditures  faU as institutional development
improves when levels of institutional development  are low.
(6) While the size of the budget deficit does not appear to influence central budget
infrastructure expenditures, it is positively associated  with consolidated  budget
expenditures.- iii  -
(7) Greater  outward orientation  is strngly  and positively associated  with increased
consolidated  budget infrastructure expenditures, but there is no apparent relationship
between outward orientation and central budget expenditures  on infrastructure.
(8) Finally, the central government's commitment to poverty influences central
government expenditures  on iqfrastructure. This is perhaps the most interesting result.  The
relationship  is inverted U-shaped; governments  that are not committed  to poverty alleviation
or have an extremely strong commitment  to poverty alleviation  spend less out of the central
budget on infrastructure. This suggests that governments  with some, but limited,
commitment  to poverty alleviation  adopt strategies  focused on increasing  the poor's
productivity  through infrastructure investments,  but that as the commitment  to poverty
alleviation  intensifies  the strategy shifts to one either fostering the poor's human capital
accumulation  or emphasizing  the provision of a social safety net and that funding for these
strategies competes  with funding  for infrastructure  provision.DETERMINANTS  OF  PUBLIC  EXPENDITURE  ON INFRASTRUCTURE:
TRANSPORTATION  AND COMMUNICATION'
I.  WHY STUDY THE  DEirm[NANTS  OF PUBUC  EXPEND1muRE  ON INFRASTRUCTURE?
The scope for investment  in infrastructure and public consumption  goods to increase
urban productivity  and national  economic  development  is the subject of renewed attention  in
developing  and transitional  economies. Recent studies document  the fact that public
investment  in infrastructure, such as roads, communications,  and utilities, stimulates  private
investment. Blejer and Khan (1984), using a cross-country  data set, find that public
investment  in infrastructure complements  private investment. Greene and Villanueva  (1991),
using a panel of 23 developing  countries, and Serven and Solimano  (1993), using a panel of
15  countries, similarly find that public investment  in infrastructure "crowds in" private
investment. Time-series studies from single developing  countries, such as Musalem's for
Mexico (1989), also document the positive link between public investment  in infrastructure
and private investment. The World  Development  Report 1994, focussing  on the link between
infrastructure and development,  expounds  numerous ways in which policy can improve the
quality, not only the quantity, of infrastructure services in less developed  countries.
Many infrastructure  investments  have characteristics  of public goods -- non-exhaustive
and non-exclusive  in consumption  -- and thus will be undersupplied  by the private sector.
Yet, infrastructure investments  facilitate  private investment  by lowering private production
costs and opening new markets, thereby creating new opportunities  for profit.  Roads reduce
transportation  costs.  Ports reduce transactions  costs and facilitate  trade, reducing  the cost of
input supplies  and exposing  domestic firms to the innovative  forces of international
competition. Telecommunications  networks  reduce transactions  costs by increasing  the flow
of information  and, as noted by Leff (1984), have important side effects that make other
economic  institutions  more efficient. Norton (1992), using pooled time-series, cross-national
data from 47 countries  from post-World War II to 1977, finds that telecommunications
networks not only increase investment, but also increase the rate of economic  growth.
Aschauer (1989, 1990) finds that road building increased economic  growth in the United
States.
I  This paper is the product of the research carried out by Susan Randolph, Zeljko Bogetic, and Dennis
Heffley under the World Bank research  project RPO-677-66 'Enhancing Urban Productivity: Determinants  of
Optimal  Expenditure  on Infrastructure,  Human Resources  and  Public Consumption  Goods". It is the product  of the
Country  Operations  Division,  Department  One, Europe  and Central Asia  Region  of the World Bank. In the course
of this research  many World Bank economists  and researchers  provided  invaluable  advice, input  and data for this
project. Particularly,  we  want to thank  Shantayannan  Devarajan,  William  Easterly,  Gregory  Ingram,  Marianne  Fay,
and Kyu Sik  Lee for valuable  discussions  and for sharing  several  important  draft papers  on the subject. In addition,
we would  like  to thank Matthew  Baker,  Fareed  Hassan,  Stephen  Onyiwu,  Sergey  Rumyantsev,  Fadel-Rahman  Sesay
and Hemsanta  Kum Shrestha  for their contributions  to data input and table preparation.  The authors are solely
responsible  for the final product.Along side the growing body of evidence substantiating  the importance  of investment
in infrastructure for development  (Heller and Diamond, 1990;  Kessides, 1993a,b; World
Bank, 1994) is an accumulation  of evidence that infrastructure  investment  in LDCs is
suboptimal.  Cardoso (1993), using panel data from six Latin American Countries for the
period 1970-85,  partially attributes the decline in investment  in Latin America to the decline
in complementary  public investment  as countries adjusted to the debt crisis.  Canning and
Fay (1993) find that rates of return to transportation  infrastructure may exceed 200 percent in
poorer, newly industrializing  countries  and are around 50 percent in less developed
agricultural  economies, suggesting  that transportation  infrastructure is seriously
undercapitalized.
In view of the direct impact of infrastructure investment  on economic  growth, the
importance  of public infrastructure investment  for stimulating  private investment  and the
mounting  evidence  of underinvestment  in public infrastructure, especially  in the wake of the
debt crisis, the question of what determines  the level of public investment  in infrastructure
naturally arises.
II.  THE OBJECTIVES  OF THE ANALYSIS
The primary objective  of this study is to isolate the factors influencing  the level of
public investment in infrastructure. To this end, we analyzed  pooled cross-national  and time-
series data to assess the relative influence  of internal features and external assistance on
observed expenditures  on infrastructure. The analysis covers 27 low-income  and middle-
income economies  over the 1980-1986  period. Of particular relevance  to Bank operations is
the estimated  influence  of the level of foreign assistance  and altemative forms of foreign
assistance, official development  assistance, commercial  bank lending, and direct foreign
investment, on infrastructure investments  after properly controlling for intemal differences  in
these economies.
The analysis  also explores the influence  of government  commitment  to poverty
alleviation  on infrastructure investments. Three principle means exist to reduce poverty:
promoting economic  opportunities  for the poor, providing social services to the poor and
providing transfers to the poor (World Bank, 1990b). The primary role of transfers is to put
a safety net below living standards,  ensuring that the poor cannot fall below a threshold
standard of living.  However, this approach must be viewed as a stopgap  measure; it does
little to increase individuals' opportunities  to rise above poverty once transfers cease.  The
provision of social services, especially  health and education,  in contrast, increases
individuals' opportunities  to rise above poverty by augmenting  their human capital.
Similarly, the promotion of economic  opportunities  for the poor directly enhances
individuals' opportunities  to avoid poverty, but this time by augmenting  their access to assets
and increasing  the return to those assets.  The provision of infrastructure such as rural feeder
roads, electrification,  irrigation or urban infrastructure supporting  small scale industry,
serves both of these ends.  As such, a government's commitment  to poverty alleviation  may
influence  infrastructure expenditures. However, to the extent that increasing  the poor's
human capital or putting a safety net in place are viewed as more effective  or politically- 3 -
feasible strategies  for poverty alleviation,  competition  for scarce government  resources could
negatively  impact  general infrastructure  expenditures  in countries committed  to poverty
alleviation.
111. CONCEPrUAL  FRAmEwoRK AND  MODEL SPECIFICATION
The analytical  framework is a four-sector general equilibrium  model, consisting of urban
households,  urban producers, rural households  and a single government. (See Appendix  A
for details of the model.) Total population  of the economy  is fixed, but households  may
migrate between the rural and urban sectors in response to perceived  differences in utility
levels.  The model is solved to determine the optimal level and mix of public expenditures  on
infrastructure, human  resources and consumption  public goods, and the optimal mix of taxes
on wages, domestic output and property.  The model can be used for simulating  the impacts
of changes in various policy  variables.  Thus, simulations  can be used to explore the
influence  of: (1) internal features of the economy, (2) the level and mix of external funding,
and (3) the specified  goal(s) of the government. The model implies a set of reduced form
equations for several forms of government  expenditures  and taxes.  In this paper, however,
we primarily use the model's reduced form solution for infrastructure spending  as a departure
point for the empirical analysis, which is at the heart of this paper.
The reduced-form  equation for infrastructure expenditures  takes the following  form:
I = I(V, E, 0) where V is a vector of characteristics  defining the economy, E is the level
and composition  of external assistance  and 0 reflects government  objectives. Some of the
characteristics  in V are dictated  by the formal structure  of the theoretical model; others are
additional  control variables that have been hypothesized  in the literature to influence  the level
of total government  expenditure  or the ability of the government  to collect taxes.  The vector
V also incorporates variables capturing differences  in structural features between countries.
The vector E includes the net flow of foreign assistance  and variables reflecting the
proportion of foreign assistance  accounted  for by official flows, commercial  bank flows, and
direct foreign investment. All governments  are assumed to emphasize  growth, but
governments  are viewed as differing  in their commitment  to alleviating  poverty.  Thus, the
vector 0 is a single variable reflecting  the government's commitment  to poverty alleviation.
Against this background,  we now turn to the description  of the categories  of variables
considered along with their hypothesized  influence  on infrastructure  expenditures.
A.  Dependent  Variable:  Per Capita  Infrastructure  Spending
The dependent  variable is per capita govemment  expenditures  on transportation  and
communications  measured  in constant 1980  US dollars.'  The determinants  of central
government  expenditures  (BTACCAPK)  and consolidated  government  expenditures
(CTACCAPK)  are estimated  separately. 2 The data source for central and consolidated
govemment expenditures is the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (IMF,  various
years) 3. Conversion  to per capita constant 1980 US dollars is accomplished  using data from
the World  Development  Report 1991: Supplementary  Data (World Bank, 1991).-4-
B.  Independent  Variables
There are three sets of explanatory  variables used in this study.  They reflect the
model's implications,  implications  from the previous empirical work, and basic intuition
regarding factors affecting infrastructure spending. In a nutshell, we postulate that
infrastructure spending  per capita depends on factors related to the domestic economy,
external financial  assistance and the government's  preferences, as revealed by various
spending  policies.  Thus, we organized the three sets of variables as ones that define:
*  Characteristics  of the economy
*  Level and mix of external funding
*  Government  objectives
1.  Characteristics of the Economy
There are five variables, implied  by the structure  of the underlying theoretical model,
which define the characteristics  of the domestic  economy. These are: (i) the existing stock of
infrastructure, (ii) population  density, (iii) urbanization, (iv) urban-rural balance, and (v)
labor force participation  rate.
1.1.  Existing Stock of Infrastructure: Two opposing  forces dictate the influence  of the
existing stock of infrastructure on current expenditures  on infrastructure. First, it is
hypothesized  that there are diminishing  returns to infrastructure expenditures  such that,
ceteris  paribus, countries with high stocks of infrastructure  are expected  to derive less benefit
from additional  expenditures  on infrastructure  and accordingly  spend less.  Second, the
greater the stock of infrastructure, the greater the expenditure  required to offset depreciation
of the existing stock. Further, previously  high levels of infrastructure expenditure  may reflect
a greater degree of complementarity  between infrastructure and the existing productive
structure  of the economy, dictating  higher optimal  levels of current infrastructure
expenditure. Overall then, the direction of influence  of the existing stock of infrastructure  is
uncertain  and reflects the relative strength  of the opposing forces.
Sensitivity  analysis is performed to determine  the sensitivity  of the results to
alternative measures  of the stock of infrastructure. Two different classes of variables are
used to measure the existing stock of infrastructure. The first is the total kilometers  of roads
plus railways relative to GDP per capita in constant 1980 US dollars (FCINFGDP)  or per
thousand square kilometers land area (FCINFPA) or per person (FCINFPP).  The data on
kilometers  of roads and railways are those compiled  by Canning and Fay and used as the
basis for their 1993 paper.  The Canning and Fay data are available  for five year intervals.
Linear and nonlinear methods were used to interpolate  the data across five-year intervals.
The data source for kilometers  of land area and population  is the World  Development  Report
1991: Supplementary  Data (World Bank, 1991). The second class of variable is an estimate
of the total capital stock (public plus private) constructed  using the perpetual  inventorymethod. The data source for this variable (K02) is also the World  Development  Report
1991:  Supplementary  Data (henceforth,  WDR9lSD).
Neither class of variables is a fully satisfactory  measure of the stock of infrastructure.
The first class of variables seriously underestimates  the total stock of infrastructure. 4 To the
extent that there is a strong positive correlation between  road and rail infrastructure and other
forms of transport and communication  infrastructure, the effect is only a scale effect and the
ranking by country is correct.  However, if the ratio between road and rail infrastructure on
the one hand, and other forms of transport and communication  infrastructure on the other,
differs substantially,  the estimates will be biased and the direction of the bias is unknown.
The second class of variables includes private as well as public capital stock.  The
relationship  between the size of the private capital stock and current government  investment
in infrastructure depends upon whether infrastructure  investment  is a net substitute or
complement  to production. As noted earlier, available  evidence suggests complementarity
between private and public capital, thus K02 should be a multiple of the stock of public
transport and communications  infrastructure. However, not enough information  has
accumulated  to determine  whether the degree of complementarity  is more or less constant
across countries and, accordingly,  the likely extent of measurement  error.
1.2.  Population Density:  Low population  density necessitates  higher expenditure  for a
given level of infrastructure service.  For example, in sparsely populated countries the miles
of telephone  wire needed to link two households  will be greater, as will the miles of road
needed to link two population  centers or to link rural and urban markets. This influence
implies that per capita infrastructure  expenditures  will be inversely related to population
density.  However, certain kinds of infrastructure  expenditure,  such as sewage systems and
treatment facilities, are of limited importance  when population  densities  are low.  On this
basis, infrastructure expenditures  would be positively  related to population density. Further,
economies  of scale may dictate a higher optimal  level of infrastructure  provision in more
densely  populated countries.  Overall then, the influence  of population  density on
infrastructure  expenditures  is uncertain.
Population  density (DENS)  is measured  as population  per square kilometer and is
computed from data on the total population  and the total land area in square kilometers.  The
data source for both components  of DENS is WDR91SD.
1.3.  Urbanization:  If economies  of scale in infrastructure  provision dominate, then ceteris
paribus, countries with a higher proportion of the population  in urban areas are expected to
spend less on infrastructure  per capita. While this force is expected  to dominate, opposing
forces are at work as well.  Urbanization  entails specialization  and hence less self-provision.
Whereas a family may dig their own well, and a village may be mobilized  to build or repair
a footpath or road, urban populations  are more likely to rely on government  provision of
these types of infrastructure services (Heller and Diamond, 1990). Further, to the extent
there is an urban bias in service provision, or if agglomeration  economies  increase the return- 6 -
to infrastructure  expenditures  in urban areas, higher urbanization  rates imply higher levels of
infrastructure service provision.
Urbanization (URBAN4)  is measured  as the annual percentage  of total population
living in urban areas, interpolated  from five-year intervals.  The data source for URBAN4 is
WDR91SD.
1.4.  Urban-Rural  Balance:  The extent of the difference  between urban and rural utility
levels is hypothesized  to influence  rural-urban migration  rates, and accordingly  the pressure
on governments  for urban services, including  infrastructure  provision.  Further, governments
may respond by attempting  to increase rural productivity  (and utility) in an effort to slow
rural-urban migration. Rural infrastructure  investments  supporting  agricultural  intensification
or rural industry offer one means to increase rural productivity. Both forces imply current
expenditures  on infrastructure will be positively related to the size of the differential  between
urban and rural utility or earnings levels.
Sensitivity  analysis is conducted  to determine the sensitivity  of results to three
alternative  measures of the urban-rural  balance.  In the theoretical  model, a utility balance
between the urban and rural sectors is maintained  through migration. The first measure of
the urban-rural balance  is a proxy for the rural-to-urban  migration  rate (MIGZ).  MIGZ is
defined as the urban population  growth rate minus the total population  growth rate.  The data
source for the urban and total population  growth rates is the Social Indicators  of Development
1990 (World Bank, 1990). The second measure of the urban-rural balance is the agricultural
GDP per capita in constant 1980 US dollars (AGCAPK). AGCAPK  is calculated  as the
percentage share of agriculture in GDP, multiplied  by GDP in constant 1980 US dollars, all
divided by the product of the total population  and 1 minus the percentage urban population.
The data source for the component  variables is WDR91SD. The greater the difference
between GDP per capita and AGCAPK,  the greater the urban-rural  imbalance. Because total
GDP per capita is included  in all regression models (see 2.1 below) the coefficient  of
AGCAPK  measures  the impact of per capita agricultural income, holding GDP per capita
constant. The lower the value of AGCAPK,  the greater the urban-rural  imbalance. The
third measure of the urban-rural balance is the percentage share of agriculture in GDP
(SAGR4). As noted above, the data source for this variable is WDR91SD. Because  both
aggregate  GDP per capita and the percentage  urban population  are included  in all
regressions, the smaller is SAGR4  the greater is the urban-rural imbalance.
1.5.  Labor Force Participation  Rate: In the theoretical  model, households  supply an
amount of labor that is fixed in physical units (e.g., person-years). The labor force
participation  rate is utilized here to capture differences  between countries  in the physical
amount of labor households  supply.  Public expenditure  on infrastructure  influence  firm
demand for labor, and accordingly,  the wage per efficiency  unit of labor supplied.'  The
relationship  between the labor force participation  rate and public expenditures  on
infrastructure  depends upon whether labor and public infrastructure investments  are
complements  or substitutes  in production. If they are complements,  then infrastructure- 7 -
expenditures  will increase  as the labor force participation  rate increases.  If they are
substitutes, the opposite will hold.  This relationship  is likely to differ for various categories
of labor and different types of infrastructure, so our empirical results will simply capture the
net effects.  To the extent that the labor force participation  variable also may be correlated
with the population  growth rate (i.e., high growth rates may imply a relatively low
proportion of the population  in the economically  active age cohorts), the estimated regression
coefficient  may reflect even more than just the net substitutability  or complementarity  of
infrastructure and labor.
The size of the labor force participation  rate (LFPER) is computed  as the total labor
force (the "economically  active" population  including the employed, the unemployed,  and the
armed forces, but excluding  homemakers,  care givers, and students) divided by the total
population, all multiplied  by 100.  The data source for both component  variables is
WDR91SD.
2.  Other Variables  Reflecting the Structure of the Economy
No theoretical model is complete  enough to provide a full list of variables that may be
important  in the empirical investigation  of many economic  phenomena. The stylized  model
that we use as departure point for our analysis does not pretend otherwise. Therefore, in
addition  to the above variables implied by the model, based on the previous empirical
studies, we also included the following  variables defining the domestic  economy: the level of
development,  internal government  budget balance, external  balance, the size of the foreign
sector, terms of trade shifts, debt obligations  and institutional  development.
2.1.  Level of Development:  Most government  services and goods are expected  to be
normal goods.  Accordingly, as income increases, the demand for infrastructure is similarly
expected  to increase, although  possibly at a diminishing  rate.  Further, as the level of
development  increases, the structure of the economy  is expected to change in ways that
increase the productivity  of infrastructure  investment. For example, industrialization
accompanies  development  and infrastructure may well be more productive  to industry than
agriculture.
Level of development  is measured  as real GDP per capita. Sensitivity  analysis is
conducted  to ascertain the sensitivity  of the results to two altemative formulations  of real
GDP per capita.  The first measure is GDPCAPK. Here, currency conversions  are
accomplished  using dollar exchange  rate conversions  and all values are deflated to 1980 US
dollars.  GDPCAPK  is computed  as total GDP in constant 1980 US dollars divided by total
population. The second measure, GDPCAP2, measures  real per capita income at
international  prices using the Summers-Heston  data.  The data series used to construct
GDPCAPK  along with GDPCAP2  are contained  in WDR91SD.- 8 -
2.2.  Internal  Balance: A high government  deficit in the previous year is expected to
decrease govemment  expenditures  in the following  year and, therefore, the government's
ability to make infrastructure investments  in the current period.  Similarly, maintenance  is
likely to be postponed  in the context of high government  deficits (Easterly, Rodriguez  and
Schmidt-Hebbel,  1994).  Accordingly,  the higher the government  deficit in the previous
period (the greater the internal imbalance),  the lower the level of infrastructure  expenditures
expected. However, several opposing  forces may be at work as well.  First, the uncertain
investment  climate caused  by deficit induced  inflation implies that the government may
choose to increase infrastructure  investment  to compensate  for or stimulate  private
investment. Further, the existence  of high deficits in the past may signal the inability or
unwillingness  of governments  to undertake the hard decisions  necessary  to bring the budget
into balance  and, accordingly,  their unwillingness  to lower infrastructure service provision.
Overall then, the relationship  between the intemal balance and current infrastructure
expenditures  is uncertain.
The measure of internal imbalance  used, BBGDPL,  is the budget balance as a
percentage of GDP (with a negative  value implying a deficit), lagged one year.  Nominal
values in domestic  currency of both the budget balance and GDP are the basis of the
computation. The data source for the component  variables is the World Bank's World Tables
1993.  Analysis  is undertaken  to explore the sensitivity  of results to an altemative measure of
intemal imbalance, the domestic inflation  rate, INFL4, given the link between intemal
balance  and domestic  inflation.  This variable captures the ability of the govemment  to
sustain a deficit without serious inflationary  consequences. INFL4 is calculated  as log
differences  of the Consumer  Price Index, when it exists, and the log differences  of the
Wholesale  Price Index otherwise. The data source for INFL4 is WDR91SD.
2.3.  External  Balance:  A priori, the relationship  between the extemal balance and
infrastructure expenditures  is unclear.  On the one hand, countries with large imbalances  in
their current account in the previous  period are likely to adopt or have imposed on them
stabilization  policies which include reining in govemment  expenditures. That is, all
government  expenditures,  including  expenditures  on infrastructure, are likely to decrease
when the external balance is negative. In addition, the maintenance  of a positive trade
balance implies that policies are being pursued which maintain  intemational  competitiveness.
A force in the opposite direction concerns the fact that the correction  of structural current
account  imbalances  may entail increased  infrastructure investments. That is, govemments
facing imbalances  need to increase their capacity to export and this may necessitate  shifting a
larger proportion of government  expenditures  to infrastructure expenditures  on ports or other
infrastructure investments  supporting  export growth.  Overall, the impact of the external
balance on infrastructure  expenditures  is uncertain.
Several altemative indicators of the extemal balance are considered. The first is the
trade balance as a proportion of GDP, lagged one year, TBWTGDPL. The trade balance for
a given year is calculated  as the value of exports minus imports, all divided by GDP (all
measured  in current local currency). The data source for the value of exports minus imports- 9 -
(resource balance) and GDP is the World Bank's World Tables 1993.  The second measure
of external balance considered is the black market foreign exchange  premium, BLACK. The
premium is based on the differences  between official exchange  rates and black market rates
and is calculated  as 100 times the black market exchange  rate minus the official  exchange
rate all divided by the official  exchange  rate.  The source for BLACK is WDR9lSD, which
compiled  data on the Black market exchange  rate from the World Currency  Yearbook.
Finally, a purchasing  power parity-based  outward orientation  index, DOLLAR4, is
considered. This index was calculated  by David Dollar, 6 and is the weighted  average of the
mean price distortion between 1973 and 1985 and its standard deviation. The weights  are the
estimated  coefficients  from a regression of GDP growth on the average price distortion over
the period and its standard deviation.  The range of DOLLAR4 for the countries examined
by David Dollar was 96 to just over 102.  Higher values of DOLLAR4 are associated  with
greater outward orientation.
2.4.  Size of the Foreign Sector: The taxable capacity  of a government  is generally
expected to be greater, the greater is the size of the foreign sector.  Imports and exports
provide an accessible  tax base and are important sources of revenue in developing  countries.
Greater tax revenue supports greater government  expenditure. To the extent that taxable
capacity limits the ability of governments  to invest in the optimal  level of infrastructure,
governments  are likely to increase expenditures  on infrastructure when the size of the foreign
sector is large.  In addition, a large foreign sector likely entails greater competitiveness. To
the extent that infrastructure investments  increase the competitiveness  of industry, larger
foreign sectors are likely to be associated  with higher expenditures  on infrastructure.
The size of the foreign sector, TVALX2, is measured  as the share of imports and
exports of goods and nonfactor services in GDP.  The data source for TVALX2 is
WDR9  lSD.
2.5.  Terms of Trade Shifts:  A deterioration  in the terms of trade is expected  to reduce
taxable capacity, forcing a government  to scale back expenditures  if a deterioration  in the
internal balance is to be prevented. Unless the composition  of expenditures  shifts,
infrastructure investments  will be proportionately  reduced. They may be more than
proportionately  reduced if falling incomes trigger increased transfer payments  or increase the
pressure on the government  to provide consumption  goods and services to offset the decline
in income.  Thus, an improvement  in the terms trade and government  expenditures  on
infrastructure are expected to be positively related.
The magnitude  of the terms of trade shock, TOTS, is measured as the percentage
change in the terms of trade during the previous year.  It is calculated  from the terms of
trade index TOT4 in WDR91SD  as (TOT4,/TOT4, 1) - 1 all multiplied  by 100, where the
subscript t refers to the current year. TOT4 is indexed  to 100 in 1980  and measures the
terms of trade as the export unit price/import unit price.  Accordingly  a negative value of
TOTS reflects a deterioration  in the terms of trade and a positive value reflects an
improvement.- 10-
2.6.  Debt Obligations:  It is hypothesized  that, overall, a larger debt obligation will
decrease  government  expenditure  on infrastructure, given the likely dominance  of this
obligation  over more discretionary  government  expenditures  such as outlays on
infrastructure. However, it is also recognized  that a large debt obligation  results, in part,
from the capacity of governments  to attract foreign savings. To the extent that a large debt
obligation  also reflects the continued  ability of governments  to attract foreign savings, unless
the current net flow of foreign savings is controlled  for in the regression, an opposing
positive relationship  between the debt obligation  and infrastructure expenditures  may be
observed.
Three alternative  measures  of the debt obligation  are considered. The first, DSGDP,
is debt service obligations  (interest  and amortization  on total extemal debt) as a percentage of
GDP.  It is computed as the total debt service ratio  (interest and amortization  on total
external debt as a percentage of export revenues)  multiplied  by the value of exports in
current local currency, all divided GDP in current local currency.  The data source for the
debt service ratio is WDR91SD, while that for the local currency value of exports and GDP
is The World Tables  1993.  This formulation  of debt  obligations  emphasizes  the magnitude
of the debt burden relative to the total productive  capacity  of the economy.  A second
formulation  focus on obligations  relative to the economy's capacity to generate foreign
exchange. TDS is the traditional  debt service ratio, the value of interest and amortization  on
total external debt as a percentage of export revenues. As noted earlier, the data source for
this variable is WDR91SD. Finally, long-term debt as a percentage  of GDP, DODGDP1, is
considered. The data source for this variable is also WDR91SD.
2.7.  Institutional Development:  It is not clear, a priori, how institutional  development  is
likely to influence  infrastructure  expenditures. Where institutional  development  is strong,
transactions  costs are lowered and the ability of the private sector to take over the supply of
some forms of infrastructure  provision may increase.  On the other hand, where institutional
development  is strong, the market is likely to flourish, increasing  private investment  and the
demand for complementary  public infrastructure.
The variable used to measure the level of institutional  development,  GASTIL, is the
arithmetic  average of two indices, one measuring  political  liberties, GAS POL, and the other
civil liberties, GAS_CIV. The index of civil liberties is a measure of the extent to which
people are able to freely express their opinions. The index of political rights is designed to
measure the extent to which individuals  have the right to participate meaningfully  in the
political  process.  These variables are indices with values from 1 (most democratic/free)  to 7
(least democratic/free). Accordingly,  lower values of GASTIL correspond to higher levels
of institutional  development. The data source for GASTIL is WDR91SD. 7
3.  The Level and Mix of External Funding
Both the level and the mix of external funding  influence  the level of infrastructure
spending. The level of foreign saving is important as it is often provided directly for- 11-
financing specific  investment  projects.  In addition, given the level of foreign savings used to
finance infrastructure spending, the composition  of foreign flows matters. For example,
foreign direct investment  is often contingent  on an externally perceived  adequacy  of business
infrastructure.
3.1.  The Level of Foreign Funding: The relationship  between the net flow of foreign
savings and infrastructure investment  is expected to be positive (Khan  and Hoshino, 1992).
Foreign savings directly provide funds for investment  in infrastructure. Foreign savings
provided for non-infrastructure  expenditures  free funds for infrastructure investment (foreign
savings are fungible).
The total level of foreign savings flows is defined as the sum of official flows, private
flows (commercial  bank, other private guaranteed  and non-guaranteed),  direct foreign
investment  and other long-term net inflows per capita in constant 1980  US dollars.  Two
variants of foreign savings inflows are considered, differing  by whether credits from the IMF
are included or excluded from the tally of official flows.  The first measure, NFFCAP1K,
includes IMF credits, the second, NFFCAP2K, excludes  IMF credits.  The data source for
the component  variables measuring  foreign savings flows is WDR91SD. Specifically,  the
variables MLDN5 (multilateral  debt), NOTN5 (net official transfers) and, in the case of
NFFCAP1K, IMFCN5 (IMF credits) are the component  variables for official flows, CBN5
(commercial  bank), OPGN5 (other private guaranteed),  and PNGN5 (private non-guaranteed)
are the component  variables for private flows, DFIN5 measures  direct foreign investment  and
OLTNIN5 measures  net other long term flows.  These nominal  flows are then converted to
constant 1980  dollars and divided by the population  for the year concerned, using data from
WDR9lSD.  Sensitivity  analysis is conducted  to determine whether IMF credits affect
infrastructure expenditures  differently  than other sources of foreign savings.
3.2.  The Mix of Foreign Funding: Given the level of net foreign flows, the amount of
direct foreign investment  is expected to increase public investment  in infrastructure, given the
perception  in the literature that foreign investors demand  infrastructure as a condition to
invest in the country concerned. There is no strong perception  that donor or commercial
bank priorities emphasized  infrastructure investments  over the past decade (Khan  and
Hoshino, 1992, provide some evidence to the contrary).  Accordingly, given the level of
total net foreign flows, the level of official and commercial  bank flows are not expected to
influence  the level of infrastructure  expenditures.
The influence  of the mix of foreign funding  is captured by alternately  including in the
regressions  variables measuring  the level of official (NOFGDP), commercial  bank
(NCBGDP),  or direct foreign investment  (DFIGDP)  flows as percentages  of GDP.  Again,
two measures  of official foreign flows are considered. The first, NOFGDP1, includes IMF
credits and the second, NOFGDP2, excludes  IMF credits.  The data source for the
component  variables used to construct these variables  is WDR91SD. Official, commercial
bank and direct foreign investment  are defined as above in the discussion of the total level of
foreign funding.- 12 -
4.  Government Objectives
Preferences of government  matter in observed public expenditure  pattems and
infrastructure spending  is no exception. In other words, government  spending  always reflects
government  priorities and, implicitly, their objectives. We attempted  to include this basic
fact in our analysis by constructing  a variable that would  approximate  the government
objectives  which are consistent  with the observed infrastructure  investment  spending. An
implied link between infrastructure spending  (particularly  in low income countries, and in
rural areas) and poverty alleviation  has been a key argument for public expenditure  on
infrastructure in many less developed  countries. To pin down this link, we constructed  a
Poverty Commitment  Index which measures the degree to which the government  is
declaratively  committed  to the eradication  of poverty.  We use this index to empirically study
the presumed links between infrastructure spending  and the government's objectives  to
eliminate  poverty.
4.1.  Poverty Commitment:  In most developing  economies  the majority of the poor reside
in rural areas.  Productivity  enhancing  infrastructure investment  in rural areas is one means
of reducing  poverty.  Accordingly, governments  with a higher commitment  to poverty
alleviation  may devote a larger share of expenditures  to infrastructure investments.
However, given the scope for reducing  poverty via increasing  health and education
expenditures  or through the provision of social safety nets, and the fact that these
expenditures  compete with infrastructure expenditures,  the overall impact of a government's
commitment  to reducing poverty on infrastructure expenditures  is uncertain.
Concern is focused  on the explicit commitment  of leaders and policy makers to
poverty alleviation  rather than the existence  of poverty per say.  While a high level of
poverty may create political  pressures for poverty redress, high levels of poverty can result
from a lack of commitment  to poverty alleviation. As such, the incidence  of poverty was
rejected as an adequate  proxy for poverty commitment. We are unaware of any existing data
source that attempts to measure the degree of commitment  to poverty alleviation  for a large
number of developing  countries.  For the purposes of this project an effort was launched  to
create a variable capturing the degree of poverty commitment  across developing  countries.
Our interest was to go beyond the rhetoric of political leaders and ascertain whether
the rhetoric reflected credible intentions and actions.  A thorough content analysis of official
reports, national development  plans, information  bulletins and books covering the 1980-90
period, produced information  upon which ordinal rankings of the degree of commitment  to
poverty alleviation  were made.'  Countries were ranked on a five point scale depending  upon
the degree of poverty alleviation  commitment. A value of 1 was assigned if there was no
mention  of any commitment  to poverty alleviation  in the documents  reviewed.  A value of 2
was assigned  to countries  when poverty alleviation  was only casually  or occasionally
mentioned  as a concern.  A value of 3 was assigned to countries where rhetoric calling for
poverty alleviation  was frequently  found in the documents  reviewed, but there was no
evidence that this intention had been translated  into on-going  programs, projects or policies.- 13 -
A value of 4 was assigned to countries when rhetoric promoting  poverty alleviation  was
backed by some credible  poverty alleviation  policy, program or project.  Finally, countries
were assigned  a value of 5 when there was overwhelming  evidence of a strong and credible
commitment  to poverty alleviation. Only countries  backing rhetoric with systematic  action
resulting in the implementation  of a well defined and coordinated  set of policies, programs
and projects were assigned  a value of 5.  The variable PCOM is the result of this effort.
Table 1 shows the Pearson Correlation Coefficient  between PCOM and several
alternative  efforts to rank absolute poverty across countries.  HDRPOOR,  is the percentage
of individuals  below the United Nations Development  Program's poverty line, defined as
"that income level below which a minimum  nutritionally  adequate  diet plus essential  non-food
requirements  are not affordable" (UNDP, 1992  pg. 208-209).9 The correlation between
PCOM and HDRPOOR is significantly  (less than 1  percent level) negative. WBPOOR  is the
incidence  of poverty reported in Table 3.2 of the World  Development  Report 1990 (World
Bank, 1990, pg. 41) and for Zambia, Egypt, Tunisia and Bangladesh  from "The Report of
the Task Force on Poverty Alleviation"  (World Bank, 1988). PCOM is positively and
significantly  (5  percent level) correlated with WBPOOR. Finally, comparable  poverty
indicators for 40 countries in 1985 are provided by Chen, Datt and Ravallion  (1993).
Several alternative  poverty lines are considered. P2185 bases the poverty assessment  on a
poverty line of $21 per month in 1985 PPP dollars.  For P3085 the poverty line is set at
$30.42 per month (1985 PPP) while for P6085 the poverty line is $60 per month (1985
PPP).  PCOM is not significantly  correlated with any of these indicators.  It should be noted
that all of the alternative  poverty indicators are positively and significantly  correlated with
each other.
Sensitivity  analysis is conducted  to determine whether our results are sensitive  to the
exclusion  of PCOM from the analysis and the substitution  of the alternative  indicators of
poverty incidence for PCOM.
IV.  RESLTS
In this section we present the results of empirical  analyses. First, basic summary
statistics  are provided.  Second, findings concerning  the determinants  of central budget per
capita expenditures  on infrastructure are presented.  This is followed by a presentation  of the
findings  for the determinants  of consolidated  budget per capita expenditures. For both
central and consolidated  budgetary expenditures,  the results of alternative base models,
differentiated  by how the existing stock of infrastructure is measured, are first presented.
This is followed by a discussion of the results from sensitivity  analyses. The final section
summarizes  the findings by comparing  and contrasting  the results concerning  the
determinants  of per capita central versus consolidated  budget expenditures  on infrastructure.- 14 -
Table 1.  Correlation  Between  PCOM & Poverty  Indicators
PCOM  IHDRPOOR  WBPOOR  P2185  P3085  P6085
PCOM  1.00***  -0.382***  0.252**  -0.034  -0.013  0.043
0.0000  0.0001  0.0209  0.6492  0.8590  0.5596
(321)  (164)  (84)  (183)  (183)  (183)
HDRPOOR  -0.382***  1.00***  0.642***  0.248**  0.350***  0.613***
0.0001  0.0000  0.0001  0.0111  0.0003  0.0001
(164)  (172)  (65)  (104)  (104)  (104)
WBPOOR  0.252**  0.642***  1.00***  0.330***  0.366***  0.513***
0.0209  0.0001  0.0000  0.0026  0.0008  0.0001
( 84)  (65)  ( 99)  ( 81)  ( 81)  ( 81)
P2185  -0.034  0.248**  0.330***  1.00***  0.964***  0.778***
0.6492  0.0111  0.0026  0.000  0.0001  0.0001
(183)  (104)  (81)  (190)  (190)  (190)
P3085  -0.013  0.350***  0.366***  0.964***  1.00***  0.8918***
0.8590  0.0003  0.0008  0.0001  0.0000  0.0001
(183)  (104)  (81)  (190)  (190)  (190)
P6085  0.0434  0.613***  0.513***  0.778***  0.892***  1.00***
0.5596  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0000
(183)  (104)  81)  (190)  (190)  (190)
Note:  Pearson Correlation Coefficient  is the first entry, below it is the significance  level, followed  by the
number of observations  in parentheses.
***'  Significant  at the .01 level  or better
**  Significant  at the .05 level or better
A.  Summary  Statistics
The analyses are run separately  for central budget  and consolidated  budget  per capita
infrastructure expenditures,  as noted earlier.  Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations  of all
variables included in the analyses for countries where data on central budget  infrastructure
expenditures  exist, while Table 3 provides the means and standard deviations  of variables when data
on consolidated  budget infrastructure expenditures  exist.  The mean per capita expenditure  on
infrastructure in the sample  is (1980) US $17.73 for the central budget  and (1980) US $19.67 for
the consolidated  budget.- 15  -
Tabb  2.  Means  of Central  Budget  Infrast  ctur  ExpendituW  Data
|  V1@  |  Vwimble  DeErm*in  N  |  Mea  Sti  |  enaim 
BTACCAPK  Cudaa  Budget  Per Capit Inrastnruture  Expendir  in 1980  US 5  150  17.73  16.71  0  8.82
FCINFPA  Kila  Re  & Rail Per 1000  Square Kilometers  Are  150  255.63  276.72  33.25  1406.14
FCINFPP  Kiomer  Roads & Rail  Per Capite  150  3.77E-3  2.91B-3  7.25B-4  1.33B-2
FCINFODP  Kilome  Rreds & Rail  Reitive  to 1980  S GDP  150  199.63  474.44  1.18  2657.5)
ODPCAPK  Per Capita Ore  Domegtic  Product  in 190  US S  150  1122.55  726.91  250.33  2940.47
GDPCAP2  Per Capib Orem Domeetr Product in PPP (Sum=mmHet  198S)  129  134.19  1079.18  313.00  4576.ao
DENS  Popmkfie Per 100D  Squro  Kildomtrs  150  105.01  129.73  5.49  515.00
URBAN4  Peoees  Urba  Pepuite  150  42.00  17.77  16.10  84.00
MIOZ  Rusial-Urban  Migitic  Rals (Urban growth  - popytim  growth)  150  1.61  1.64  -2.66  9.14
SAOR4  Agrltuwi  Output  as Pesronag  of GODP  143  21.09  9.28  7.11  45.36
AOCAPK  Aioulktu  ODP Per Capilt in 1980  US S  143  394.30  269.65  95.94  1249.S3
LFPfR  Labor Fomr ma  Perc_ma  of PpuheDn  150  36.53  5.76  27.61  51.72
BBODPL  Budge  Bakae - a PenDt4  o  -Pad one  150  -6.30  5.11  -31.05  5.41
(Nepive  ain.Impies Defi&i)
INFL4  Infllm  Rale  141  26.23  49.71  0.31  477.49
TVALM2  Sblr  of Imprb  and Exports  in GODP  150  0.22  0.11  0.05  0.51
TBWrODPL  Trade Bahnce os  a Percentge of GODP  lAgged One Yar  150  -3.87  6.50  -22.58  13.90
BLACK  Black Maket Foreig  ixdaenge  Prems  150  33.16  70.19  -10.34  500.0o
DOLLAR4  David's Purchming  Power Parity  Ouhtud  Orieoatio  Index  126  100.63  1.10  97.00  102.00
TOTS  Pecentaeg Change in Term  of Trade From last  Year  150  -2.32  10.20  -50.33  35.14
DSODP  ltee  &  Amord  on ToW  Euenml  Debt *  a  9  of GDP  150  6.81  3.48  0.72  21.26
TDS  Debt Sevioe Ratio  Croal Debt)  150  0.30  0.16  0.04  0.81
DODODPI  LAng  Tem  Debt as  Petage  of ODP  150  47.10  28.35  10.50  143.00
GASTIL  Lavel  of Imti;tstioml  Development  150  4.35  1.40  1.00  7.00
PCOM  Commibfen to Povert AievLtin  150  3.44  1.20  1.00  5.00
MDRPOOR  Hum  Developmeot  Report'  Povesty  Incidace  86  35.14  16.51  12.0D  71.00
WBPOOR  Worl  Development  Repot's  Poy  Incidence  54  27.37  S.71  14.00  43.00
P21S5  Ravi;imi's Poverty  Incidene: S21/1mwh in 19t5 PPP  109  20.0o  17.4S  2.04  58.94
P3085  Rvallio's  Povery  Incidenc:  S30.42Vmont  in 1985  PPP  109  33.12  20.96  7.11  72.96
Prim5  Ravhitin's  Poverty  Incidence:  560manth  in 19S5  PPP  109  61.65  18.50  35.19  94.94
NFFCAPlK  Net ForeigP  Flw  Inlcheive  of IMF Flom i  190  US $  150  52.41  99.S3  -377.20  771.47
NFFCAP2K  Net Poreig  Fl"  Exclusive  of IMP Flos  in 1980  US S  150  47.94  94.05  -368.35  707.65
NOFODPI  Not Oftncr FbW schnive of IMF Flwr a  a  S  of ODP  150  2.75  2.57  40.91  IH55
NOFODP2  Net Ofrr  Flow  Excblsive  of IMP Flows  as a % of GDP  150  2.31  1.98  4.54  11.59
NCBODP  Net Commrlc  Balk Flow,s a  *  of  ODP  150  0.80  1.71  -7.67  6.34
DFIODP  Net Diect  Foreipg  Invtment Flows  a S of GDP  150  0.69  1.09  -1.52  5.21
YS0  Daummy  Varible Set to I f Yer  is 198  150  0.15  0.36  o.0o  1.0D
YSI  Dummy  Varible Set to I if Year is 198l  150  0.14  0.35  0.00  1.0D
Y82  Dummy  VarihblSet  to l if Yesr isl9S2  150  0.13  0.34  0.00  1.00
Y83  Dumy  VeriblS  et  to  if Year is93  150  0.14  0.35  0.00  1.00
Y84  Dummy  Varb  Set  to I if Year is 19S4  150  0.15  0.35  0.00  1.00
YS5  Dummy Vibl  St  to I  f Yesr is 19S5  150  0.15  0.35  o.o0  1.00
Y86  Dummy Variblle3  e to I if Yer i  I56  150  0.14  0.35  o.0o  1.00
="  --. II - 16 -
Tabe  3.  Me  of Consolidad  Budget Infrastcture  Fpmdite  Data
[V  de  Variable Definition  N  Mean  A  td.  jMinimum  Maximum
CTACCAPK  Consolidated Budget Per Capita Infrastructure Expenditures  in 19S0 US S  132  19.67  16.64  0  88.82
FCINFPA  Kilometers Roads  & Rail Per  1000 Square Kilorneters Area  132  252.82  285.09  33.25  1406.14
FCINFPP  Kilometers Roads & Rail  Per Capita  132  3.77E-3  3.14E-3  7.25E-4  1.33E-2
FCINFGDP  Kilometers Roads  & Rail Relative to  1980 $ GDP  132  217.59  504.30  1.18  2657.80
GDPCAPK  Per Capita Gross Domestic Product in  1980 US S  132  1152.52  762.26  250.34  2940.47
GDPCAP2  Per Capita Grou  Domestic Product in PPP (Sununera-Heston  1988)  113  1858.18  1118.02  313.00  4576.00
DENS  Population Per 1000 Square Kilomreters  132  108.52  134.95  5.49  515.00
URBAN4  Percentage  Urban Population  132  41.38  17.72  16.50  84.00
MIGZ  Rural-Urban Migration Rate (Urban growth - population growth)  132  1.65  1.58  -0.67  9.14
SAGR4  Agricultural Output as a Percentage of GDP  129  20.69  9.04  7.11  45.36
AGCAPK  Agricultural GDP Per Capita in  1980 US S  129  398.63  284.04  95.94  1249.83
LFPER  Labor Force  as a Percentage of Population  132  36.93  5.74  27.61  51.72
BBGDPL  (BNd  et;  Ba1sne  y aa  Percfntatge of GDP Lagged One Year  132  -6.57  5.39  -31.05  5.41 (Ngtve VluVe  ImpiesiJeitit
INFIA  Inflation Rate  123  25.25  52.00  0.35  477.49
TVALX2  Share of Imports and Exports in GDP  132  0.23  0.12  0.05  0.51
TBWTGDPL  Trade Balance as a Percentage of GDP Lagged One Year  132  -3.76  6.92  -22.58  13.90
BLACK  Black Market  Foreign Exchange Premia  132  31.78  69.98  -10.34  500.00
DOLLAR4  David's  Purchasing Power Parity Outward Orientation Index  110  100.60  1.13  98.00  102.00
TOTS  Percentage  Change in Terms of Trade From Last Year  132  -1.96  9.73  -32.45  35.14
DSGDP  Interest & Amortization on Total External Debt as a  % of GDP  132  6.73  3.53  0.72  21.26
TDS  Debt Service Ratio (otal  Debt)  132  0.29  0.16  0.04  0.81
DODGDPI  Long Term  Debt as a Percentage of GDP  132  48.57  29.43  10.50  143.00
GASTIL  Level  of Institutional Development  132  4.34  1.41  1.00  7.00
PCOM  Commitment to Poverty  Alleviation  132  3.66  1.26  1.00  5.00
HDRPOOR  Human Development Report's  Poverty Incidence  75  30.63  12.94  12.00  71.00
WBPOOR  World Development Report's  Poverty Incidence  61  26.18  8.84  14.00  43.00
P2185  Ravallion's  Poverty Incidence:  $21/month in 1985 PPP  93  17.03  13.91  2.04  46.09
P3085  Ravallion'a  Poverty Incidence:  $30.42/month  in 1985 PPP  93  30.89  18.52  7.11  72.96
P6085  Ravallion's  Poverty Incidence:  $60/month in  1985 PPP  93  60.89  17.84  35.19  94.94
NFFCAPIK  Net Foreign Flows Inclusive of IMF  Flows in 1980 US $  132  56.66  104.98  -377.20  771.47
NFFCAP2K  Net Foreign Flows Exclusive of IMF Flows in 1980 US S  132  52.19  98.83  -368.35  707.65
NOFGDPI  Net Official Flows Inclusive of IMF Flows as a % of GDP  132  2.73  2.65  -0.91  11.55
NOFGDP2  Net Official Flows Exclusive of IMF Flows as a  % of GDP  132  2.32  2.03  -0.54  11.59
NCBGDP  Net Commercial Bank Flows as a % of GDP  132  0.80  1.74  -7.67  6.34
DFIGDP  Net Direct Foreign Investment Flows as a  % of GDP  132  0.73  1.14  -1.52  5.21
YS0  Dummy Variable Set to  I if Year is 1980  132  0.15  0.36  0.00  1.00
YSI  Dummy Variable Set to  I if Year is 1981  132  0.14  0.34  0.00  1.00
Y82  Dummy Variable Set to  I if Year is 1982  132  0.13  0.34  0.00  1.00
Y83  Dummy Variable Set to  I if Year is 1983  132  0.14  0.34  0.00  1.00
Y84  Dummy Variable Set to  I if Year is 1984  132  0.15  0.36  0.00  1.00
Y85  Dummy Variable Set to  I if Year is  1985  132  0.15  0.36  0.00  1.00
Y86  Dummy Variable Set to  I if Year is 1986  132  0.14  0.35  0.00  1.00- 17 -
A frequency distribution  of countries included  in the base analysis by year is
provided in Tables 4 and 5 for the central and consolidated  budget analyses, respectively.
As can be seen, the data series are incomplete  for about 40 percent of the countries. In
order to maximally  exploit the available  information,  the base and sensitivity  analyses are
initially undertaken  using OLS; that is, initially no correction for bias resulting from
autocorrelation  is undertaken. Note, even in the presence  of autocorrelation,  the OLS
estimates  of the coefficients  are unbiased  and consistent, although  they are not efficient.
With positive autocorrelation,  the estimates  of the coefficient  variances are negatively  biased
implying  that the calculated  acceptance  regions are narrower than they should be for the
specified  level of significance  or confidence. This implies that the estimated significance
levels are overestimates  of the true significance  levels.  For the base sets of models, a test
for autocorrelation  is undertaken, using a method which corrects for autocorrelation. No
evidence of autocorrelation  is found, and differences  between the corrected and uncorrected
results are minimal. Accordingly, correction  of the sensitivity  analyses for autocorrelation
was deemed unwarranted.
B.  Determinants of Per Capita Central  Budget Expenditures  on Infrastructure
Appendix B presents the signs and significance  levels of variables for all sensitivity
analyses undertaken  to isolate the determinants  of per capita central budget expenditures  on
infrastructure without any correction for autocorrelation. 1 '  All of the regressions  are highly
significant  with adjusted R2s ranging from .70 to .84, but typically  in the .78 to .81 range."
All variables are consistently  significant  in the base runs, with the exception  of the
stock of infrastructure, the internal balance, the terms of trade shock and some of the
variables capturing the mix of foreign savings. Several of these variables are sensitive  to the
exact definition  of the variable.  In addition, significance  levels are generally  low, or
fluctuate  across specifications  for the variables  assessing  the impact of the external balance
and debt obligations  on per capita central budget expenditures  on infrastructure.
1.  The Stock of Infrastructure
Table B1 in Appendix  B presents the signs and significance  levels of variables for the
alternative OLS base regressions. Four different bases are considered, differing by how the
stock of infrastructure  is measured. For each alternative  base, five regressions are included.
The first regression  in each set (Ml) excludes  the influence  of foreign savings from
consideration  altogether, while the second (M2) includes the influence  of foreign savings but
excludes  any variable reflecting the mix of foreign savings from consideration.  The last
three regressions include a variable reflecting the mix of foreign savings. The third (M3)
focuses on the influence  of official savings  flows, the fourth (M4) on the influence  of
commercial  bank flows and the fifth (M5) on the influence  of direct foreign investment.- 18 -
Table 4.  Central Budget Regressions: Number of Observations by Country
Country  Country  Number of Obs.
Bolivia  BOL  3
Brazil  BRA  5
Chile  CHL  - 7
Cameroon  CMR  6
Costa Rica  CRI  7
Egypt  -EGY  7
Guatemala  GTM  7
India  IND  7
Kenya  KEN  7
South  Korea  KOR  7
Liberia  LBR  7
Sri Lanka  LKA  7
Morocco  MAR  7
Mexico  MEX  7
Mauritius  MUS  7
Malaysia  MYS  7
Nigeria  NGA  2
Nicaragua  NIC  1
Pakistan  PAK  7
Panama  PAN  2
Peru  PER  7
Philippines  PHL  7
Thailand  THA  7
Turkey  TUR  4
Tanzania  TZA  3
Zimbabwe  ZWE  5- 19  -
Table 5.  Consolidated Budget Regressions: Number of Observations by Country
Country  Country Code  Number of Obs.
Bolivia  BOL  3
Brazil  BRA  5
Chile  CHL  7
Cameroon  CMR  6
Costa Rica  CRI  7
Egypt  EGY  7
Guatemala  GTM  3
Indonesia  IDN  7
India  IND  7
South  Korea  KOR  7
Liberia  LBR  7
Sri Lanka  LKA  7
Morocco  MAR  7
Mexico  MEX  7
Mauritius  MUS  7
Malaysia  MYS  7
Nicaragua  NIC  1
Pakistan  PAK  7
Panama  PAN  2
Thailand  THA  7
Turkey  TUR  4
Tanzania  TZA  3
Zimbabwe  ZWE  7
The effect of the stock of infrastructure  on per capita central budget infrastructure
expenditures  is sensitive  to how the stock of infrastructure  is measured. When infrastructure
is measured narrowly as the kilometers of roads and rail, the coefficient  is always positive,
although  not significantly  so when the stock of roads and railways is measured relative to
GDP per capita. In addition, when this stock is measured  relative to the population size, the
effect is nonlinear. The magnitude  of the impact  of the stock of infrastructure on per capita
central government  infrastructure  expenditures  is not insubstantial. A one kilometer increase
in the stock of roads and rail per thousand square kilometers  land area increases
infrastructure  expenditures  by US 1980 $ 0.01 per capita.  At the sample mean, this implies
an elasticity of 0.23.  (Unless  otherwise noted, all elasticity estimates  are based on model 2
(M2) in each regression set, the model including  foreign funding flows, but excluding the
breakdown  by source of funding, and are calculated  assuming the mean values of the
independent  variable of concern and the independent  variable.)  A one kilometer  increase in
the stock  per US 1980 $ GDP increases  per capita infrastructure  expenditures  by two to four- 20 -
tenths of a cent.  Here the elasticity estimate at the sample mean is considerably  lower, 0.03.
The stock of infrastructure, measured  as the number of kilometers of road plus rail per
person, positively influences  per capita central budget  infrastructure expenditures  until road
plus rail kilometers per person reaches a value of .00715, about two times the sample mean
value.  The elasticity  estimate at the sample mean is considerably  larger, 0.29.  When the
stock of infrastructure is measured  broadly as the total capital stock, the coefficient  is
negative, but never significantly  so.
Overall, a conclusion  that the stock of infrastructure  increases per capita central
government  infrastructure expenditures  by a sizable amount appears warranted. The impact
of expenditures  needed to offset depreciation  of the existing infrastructure stock and/or
complementarity  between infrastructure  and the structure of the economy, more than fully
offsets the effect of diminishing  returns to infrastructure expenditures.
The significance  of other variables as determinants  of per capita infrastructure
expenditure  is quite robust across the alternative  bases.  Among the alternative bases, a
narrow definition  of infrastructure  appears to more faithfully  track the total public
infrastructure  stock.  Among the three alternative  narrow definitions  of infrastructure, the
definition  of infrastructure  stock as the total kilometers  of road and rail per 1000 square
kilometers  land area, FCINFPA, performs marginally  better overall and, accordingly, is used
as the base for the sensitivity  analyses.  The full results of the five regressions (Ml through
M5) using this narrow definition  of the stock of infrastructure  are shown in Table 6.  The
results in Table 6 do not include any correction for autocorrelation.
Before proceeding  further, a test for autocorrelation  is in order.  The results of simple
autocorrelation  tests from the OLS estimates  are inappropriate,  given the pooled cross-
section, time-series  nature of the data set.  One means of ensuring coefficient  estimates  are
efficient as well as unbiased is to include in the regressions  dummy variables for the year of
the observation.  An appropriate test for autocorrelation  is then to test whether the year
dummies  are jointly significant  by means of an F test.  Table 7 shows the results of the same
base set of regressions including  a set of dummy  variables for year.  Here Y81 is set equal to
1 if the observation  is from 1981, but zero otherwise; Y82 is set equal to 1 if the observation
is from 1982, but zero otherwise, and so on.  The omitted year is 1980. The formula for
computing the F value for the joint  significance test is [(R 2Q - R2K)/(1  - R2Q)]/[(n-Q)/(Q-K)]
where Q and K are the number of regressors in the expanded  and original regressions
(including  the intercept), respectively, and n is the number of observations. The resultant  F
values for the five models are 0.97, 0.53, 0.62, 0.38 and 0.63, respectively. The critical FQ
K  ,-Qvalue  at the 20  percent significance  level is greater than 1.40 in all cases.  There is no
evidence  of autocorrelation. Further, the coefficient  magnitudes  are quite comparable
between estimates, as are significance  levels for the independent  variables, although
TBWTGDPL  and DSGDP increase somewhat  in significance,  while NFFCAP1K decreases
somewhat  in significance. In view of the absence of any evidence of bias from
autocorrelation,  no correction for autocorrelation  is required, and the sensitivity  analyses are
undertaken  excluding any control for the year of observation.- 21 -
Table 6.  Central Budget Base Infrastructure  Regressions
Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5
INTERCEPT  25.80w  24.17  26.04r  34.32  26.28*
(2.35)  (2.25)  (2.38)  (3.08)  (2.45)
FCINFPA  1.04E-2*  1.06E-2-  1.12E-r  1.08E-2  1.13E2t
(2.33)  (2.43)  (2.53)  (2.52)  (2.65)
GDPCAPK  3.53E-2  3.62E-2-  3.48E-2  3.34E-2"  3-52123 
(6.62)  (6.93)  (6.38)  (6.43)  (6.92)
GDPCPKSQ  -3.66E-6"  -4.23E-6-  -4.05E-6"  -3.53E-6  3.86E-
(-2.29)  (-2.68)  (-2.54)  (-2.26)  (-2.50)
DENS  1.13E-1-  1.14E-1  1.05E-1  9.97E-2  1.07E-r
(4.09)  (4.20)  (3.69)  (3.70)  (4.02)
DENSSQ  -3.58E-4  -3.52E-4  -3.38E-4  -3. 18E-4  -3.3tB4
(-6.55)  (-6.59)  (-6.09)  (-5.94)  (-6.31)
URBAN4  -4.72E-1  -4.63E-1  -4.52E-1  -5.47E-1-  495&17
(-5.96)  (-5.97)  (-5.77)  (-6.69)  (-6.44)
MIGZ  4.54'  4.55  4.51-  4.45-  4.26-
(5.77)  (5.91)  (5.86)  (5.91)  (5.60)
LFPER  -1.35  ~  -1.32-  -1.33  ~  -1.43-  -1.28-
(-6.95)  (-6.98)  (-7.02)  (-7.56)  (-6.89)
BBGDPL  -2.07E-1  -2.37E-1  -2.35E-1  -1.76E-1  -1.39E-1
(-1.24)  (-1.46)  (-1.44)  (-1.10)  (-0.86)
TVALX2  52.79  48.96-  52.67-  45.81-  37.55
(6.41)  (5.99)  (5.78)  (5.68)  (4.05)
TBWTGDPL  2.05E-1-  2.28E-1  2.04E-1-  3.31E-1-  1.68E-1
(1.71)  (1.94)  (1.70)  (2.74)  (1.42)
TOTS  -1.09E-1  -8.92E-2  -9.12E-2  -1.08E-1  -1.06E-1
(-1.56)  (-1.31)  (-1.33)  (-1.61)  (-1.58)
TOTSSQ  -5.58E-3  -4.79E-3*  -4.62E-3*  -4.36E-3  -4.24E-3
(-2.10)  (-1.83)  (-1.76)  (-1.71)  (-1.64)
DSGDP  5.62E-1  3.59E-1  3.60E-1  7.07E-1  5.79E-1"
(2.36)  (1.47)  (1.47)  (2.61)  (2.33)- 22 -
Table 6 (Con't). Central Budget Base Infrastructure  Regressions
Variables  Model  1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5
GASTIL  -2.69-  -2.52  -2.47"  -2.52-  -2.58~
(-4.27)  (-4.08)  (-4.00)  (-4.19)  (-4.30)
PCOM  7.71w  8.09  7.70w  6.49  8.49w
(2.29)  (2.45)  (2.31)  (1.98)  (2.53)
PCOMSQ  -1.07-  -1.-14w  1.08  -8.65E-1-  -1.23w
(-2.08)  (-2.26)  (-2.13)  (-1.72)  (-2.37)
NFFCAP1K  - 2.03E-2*  2.30E-2-  1.39E-2*  27'
(2.67)  (2.82)  (1.78)  (2.66)
NOFGDP1  - - -3.37E-1  -
(-0.92)
NCBGDP  - - 1.29-  -
(2.73)
DFIGDP  - - - - -3.12w
(-2.10)
DFIGDPSQ  - - - - .l10
(3.02)
R
2 0.8097  0.8195  0.8207  0.8293  0.8323
Adjusted R
2 0.7852  0.7947  0.7945  0.8044  0.8063
F- Value  33.042  33.050  31.319  33.240  32.010
N  150  150  150  150  150
Significant at .01 level  or better
- Significant at .05  level or better
Significant at  .10 level or better- 23  -
Table  7.  Central  Budget  Infrastructure  Regressions  with Time  Dummies
Variables  Model  1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5
INTERCEPT  27.33"  25.90"  28.49  ~  35.59w  28.18-
(2.45)  (2.34)  (2.54)  (3.10)  (2.57)
FCINFPA  1.16E-2  1.13E-2  1.23E-2-  1.13E-r  122E-
(2.57)  (2.53)  (2.71)  (2.58)  (2.81)
GDPCAPK  3.49E-2-  3.57E-2-  3.37E-2  3.31E-2  3.50E-2
(6.50)  (6.71)  (6.05)  (6.23)  (6.76)
GDPCPKSQ  -3.64E-6  -4.12E-6  -3.84E-6-  -3.46E-6-  -3.80E.6
(-2.26)  (-2.56)  (-2.37)  (-2.16)  (-2.42)
DENS  1.17E-1  1.15E-1  1.05E-1  l.O1E-1-  1.1OE-1
(4.18)  (4.18)  (3.63)  (3.67)  (4.07)
DENSSQ  -3.65E-4*  -3.57E-4  -3.40E-4  -3.23E-4  -3.37BS4
(-6.63)  (-6.53)  (-6.05)  (-5.85)  (-6.32)
URBAN4  -4.80E-1  -4.71E-&1  -4.57E-1  -5.50E-1  -5.07&4r
(-6.03)  (-5.99)  (-5.75)  (-6.60)  (-6.51)
MIGZ  4.47w  4.47w  4.43  4.38  4.18-
(5.62)  (5.69)  (5.65)  (5.69)  (5.39)
LFPER  -1.35w  -1.33*  -1.34  -1.43-  -1.27-
(-6.93)  (-6.88)  (-6.96)  (-7.39)  (-6.77)
BBGDPL  -2.31E-1  -2.55E-1  -2.53E-1  -1.89E-1  -1.73E-1
(-1.32)  (-1.47)  (-1.46)  (-1.09)  (-1.01)
TVALX2  49.64-  47.29-  52.29-  44.53w  33.80-
(5.69)  (5.44)  (5.45)  (S.1I8)  (3.34)
TBWTGDPL  3.26E-1-  3.03E-1-  2.89E-1-  3.81E-1  2.53E-1'
(2.39)  (2.24)  (2.14)  (2.80)  (1.90)
TOTS  -1.14E-1  -1.OOE-l  -1.OlE-1  -1.18E-1  -1.16E-1
(-1.53)  (-1.37)  (-1.38)  (-1.63)  (-1.61)
TOTSSQ  -5.20E-3  -5.22E-3-  -4.62E-3  -4.88E-3*  -4.60E-3
(-1.71)  (-1.74)  (-1.52)  (-1.66)  (-1.55)
DSGDP  7.02E-1  5.01E-1  5.28E-1l  8.07E-1-  7.79E-1-
(2.71)  (1.83)  (1.92)  (2.73)  (2.78)- 24  -
Table 7 (Con't).  Central Budget Infrastructure  Regressions with Time Dummies
Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5
GASTIL  -2.61w  -2.47-  -2.42-  -2.48w  -2.50
(4.08)  (-3.89)  (-3.81)  (-3.98)  (-4.05)
PCOM  7.57  7.72-  7.27w  6.21-  8.31-
(2.22)  (2.29)  (2.15)  (1.85)  (2.42)
PCOMSQ  -1.03-  -1.07  ~  -1.00,  -8.1  lE-I  -I. 19
(-1.98)  (-2.07)  (-1.93)  (-1.57)  (-2.24)
NFFCAPIK  - -1.72E-2  1.96E-2  1.  17E-2  1.73E-2
(2.04)  (2.28)  (1.38)  (2.05)
NOFGDP1  - - -4.72E-1  -
(-1.21)
NCBGDP  - - 1.2r  -
(2.49)
DFIGDP  - -3.23w
(-2.14)
DFIGDPSQ  - - - - I.15-
(3.08)
Y81  -9.31E-1  -1.28  -1.01  -1.42  -2.11
(-0.39)  (-0.54)  (-0.42)  (-0.61)  (-0.91)
Y82  1.03  7.93E-1  1.02  2.63E-2  -5.18E-1
(0.42)  (0.32)  (0.42)  (0.01)  (-0.21)
Y83  -2.97E-1  -7.17E-1  -5.74E-1  -6.  1OE-I  -2.10
(-0.11)  (-0.28)  (-0.22)  (-0.24)  (-0.81)
Y84  -2.39  -2.13  -2.16  -2.27  -2.72
(-0.96)  (-0.86)  (-0.87)  (-0.94)  (-1.13)
Y85  -4.33  -3.33  -3.70  -2.93  -4.42*
(-1.65)  (-1.26)  (-1.39)  (-1.13)  (-1.70)
Y86  -2.88  -1.48  -2.17  -1.39  -2.89
(-1.07)  (-0.54)  (-0.78)  (-0.51)  (-1.07)
0.8181  0.8240  0.8260  0.8324  0.8373
Adjusted  R 2 0.7849  0.7902  0.7910  0.7986  0.8029
F-Value  24.637  24.380  23.553  24.627  24.342
N  150  150  150  150  150
Significant  at .01 level or better
Significant  at .05 level or better
Significant  at .10 level or better- 25 -
2.  Population Density
Population density is highly significant  in all regressions.  Significance  levels show
little variation across all base regressions, as can be seen in Table BI in Appendix  B.  It is
highly significant,  generally at the 1 percent level, in all sensitivity  analyses except when per
capita GDP is measured  in purchasing power parity dollars and when poverty incidence
variables replace the poverty commitment  variable, as can be seen from the other tables in
Appendix  B.  Population density  positively influences  per capita central budget infrastructure
expenditures,  but the effect is nonlinear.  The estimated sign suggests that economies  of
scale induce a higher level of  infrastructure  provision in more densely populated  countries or
that certain types of infrastructure  expenditures  become  more necessary in the context of high
population  densities.
The impact of population  density is substantial  as can be seen from Table 6.  In the
base regression using FCINFPA and including  the total flow of foreign savings  per capita,
the  impact of population  density is found to increase  per capita expenditures  until the
population  density reaches a value of 161, about one and a half times the mean population
density in the sample.  At the mean population  density, population  density independently
accounts  for (1980)  US $ 8.05 of the total per capita central budget  infrastructure
expenditures  and implies an elasticity  of 0.24 when per capita infrastructure  expenditures  are
at their mean value.  The size of the estimated  impact is somewhat  greater in the alternative
base regressions, and sometimes  smaller in some of the sensitivity  analyses.
3.  Urbanization
Urbanization  is a significant  determinant  of central  budget infrastructure  expenditures.
It is significant  at the 1 percent level or better in all estimates, with the exception  of the
estimates  replacing PCOM with indicators of poverty incidence, as can be seen from the
tables in Appendix  B.
Urbanization  reduces per capita central budget  infrastructure expenditures,  ceteris
paribus, as hypothesized. The effect of urbanization  is substantial. The coefficient  range is
reasonably stable across all sensitivity  analyses. A one percentage  point increase in the
urbanization  rate reduces per capita central budget expenditures  on infrastructure  by
approximately  (1980) US $ 0.50.  At the sample means for urbanization  level and per capita
infrastructure expenditures,  this implies an elasticity  of -1.1.
4.  Sectoral Balance
The greater the imbalance  between  rural and urban sectors, the higher are per capita
central budget expenditures  on infrastructure, as hypothesized.  The coefficient  for the rural-
urban migration rate, MIGZ, is positive and highly significant  in all base regressions (1
percent level or better).  It is positive and highly significant  in all sensitivity  analyses with- 26 -
the exception  of the regressions replacing  poverty commitment  with poverty incidence, which
as will be discussed  later, appears to lead to specification  error.
The magnitude  of the impact is sizable. When the migration  rate increases  by one
percentage point, per capita central  budget expenditures  on infrastructure increase by
approximately  (1980) US $ 4.50, as can be seen from Tables 6 and 7.  The implied elasticity
at the sample mean migration  rate and per capita infrastructure  expenditure  level is 0.41.
The sensitivity  analyses indicate some variation in the estimated magnitude  of the effect.
With few exceptions, however, the range of estimates  falls between (1980) US $ 4.00 and
US $ 5.00.
This finding is, however, sensitive  to how the sectoral balance  is measured  as can be
seen from Table B2 in Appendix B.  Both the share of GDP in the agricultural sector,
SAGR4, and the level of agricultural  income per capita, AGCAPK,  positively influence  the
per capita infrastructure  expenditures. Holding per capita GDP and urbanization  constant,
higher values of these variables should reflect greater sectoral balance.  However, because as
the level of development  increases  the share of income earned in rural areas from agricultural
activities tends to decrease, and because neither variable accounts  for differences  in social
service provision between rural and urban areas, these proxies for rural welfare are not likely
to measure differences  between rural and urban welfare as accurately  as migration  rates.
s.  Labor Force Paflicipation Rate
The greater the labor force participation  rate, the lower is per capita central budget
infrastructure expenditure. LFPER is without exception  significant  at the 1 percent level.
The strong (and robust) negative  relationship  found indicates that labor and infrastructure are
net substitutes  and/or that more rapid population  growth induces  higher per capita
expenditure  on infrastructure, other factors (including  per capita GDP) held constant. Note
that the ceteris  pafibus  condition is important  in making  sense of this result.  It implies, for
example, that countries with low labor force participation  rates (high population  growth
rates) can achieve comparable  per capita GDP levels by substituting  public infrastructure for
labor.
The magnitude  of the impact  of the labor force participation  rate is substantial  as can
be seen from Tables 6 and 7.  A one percentage  point increase in the labor force
participation  rate reduces per capita central government  expenditures  on infrastructure  by
about (1980) US $ 1.30, implying an elasticity  of -2.73 at the sample mean values for
LFPER and BTACCAPK. The magnitude  of the estimated  impact is somewhat  greater when
the stock of infrastructure is measured  relative to the size of the population  and somewhat
lower when the stock is measured as the total capital stock.  While there is some variation in
the estimated magnitude  of the effect across sensitivity  analyses, the range of estimates  is
generally  between (1980) US $1.20 and $1.50. The elasticity estimates  are always very
large, and range between -2.5 and -3.1.- 27 -
6.  Level of Development
The level of GDP per capita positively influences  per capita infrastructure
expenditures, as hypothesized. However, the effect is nonlinear. The estimated coefficient
levels are highly significant  (generally  at the 1 percent level for the linear term and the 5
percent level for the negative quadratic term) in all regressions  measuring level of
development  as GDPCAPK. In addition, the variation in the size of the estimated
coefficients  is quite small across all regressions. The estimated  coefficients  for the base
FCINFPA regression including total foreign savings flows (Table 6, M2) indicate that for per
capita GDP levels below (1980)  US $ 4282, increases in per capita GDP increase per capita
central budget expenditures  on infrastructure. At the sample mean values of GDPCAPK  and
BTACCAPK,  the elasticity is 1.69, indicating  per capita infrastructure expenditures  respond
more than proportionately  to increases  in per capita GDP.
Whether or not the effect of GDP per capita increases is nonlinear is sensitive  to how
per capita GDP is measured. When measured in 1985 PPP dollars, the quadratic term fails
to reach significance,  as can be seen in Table B3 in Appendix  B.  The estimated  coefficient
for the linear term indicates that for each $100 increase in per capita income measured  in
1985 PPP dollars, central budget  expenditures  on infrastructure  increase  by about (1980) US
$ 1.50, implying an elasticity of 1.57 at the sample mean values for GDPCAP2  and
BTACCAPK.
7.  Internal Balance
Evidence  that governments  respond to fiscal crises by scaling back central government
expenditures  on infrastructure  is mixed.  The sign of the coefficient  for BBGDPL is
consistently  negative (contradicting  this hypothesis),  as can be seen in Tables 6 and 7 and all
tables in Appendix  B.  However, in the base regressions (Tables 6 and 7) and sensitivity
analyses for the stock of infrastructure (Table B1 in Appendix  B) BBGDPL  is never
significant  at the 10 percent level, and seldom  reaches significance  at the 15 percent level.
Tables B3 and B5 through B7 in Appendix  B also suggest central government  infrastructure
expenditures  may be protected, even in the context of high government  budget deficits.  The
lack of response may also be due to the long planning  periods and bonding  procedures
inherent in infrastructure investments. That is, this year's expenditures  on infrastructure are
unlikely  to be influenced  by recent fiscal pressures.  Whether or not infrastructure
expenditures  several years in the future are likely to be negatively  impacted  by current
budget deficits is a question which merits exploration.
Several of the sensitivity  analyses lend stronger support to contentions  that
infrastructure expenditures  are sensitive  to fiscal crises.  However, the evidence  indicates
higher budget deficits are associated  with higher, rather than lower, infrastructure
expenditure. The sensitivity  analyses exploring  the effect of alternative  indicators of sectoral
imbalance  (Table B2 in Appendix  B) indicate a negative relationship  between BBGDPL and
central budget per capita infrastructure expenditures,  significant  at the 10 to 15 percent level,- 28 -
as do sensitivity  analyses exploring the impact of poverty on infrastructure expenditures
(Table B8 in Appendix  B).
The opposite  conclusion  is reached when inflation is used as an indicator of the
degree of internal balance, as Table B4 in Appendix  B indicate. A significantly  negative, but
nonlinear effect is found bottoming  out only when the inflation rate reaches about 230
percent.  It may be that what is more important than the actual size of the budget deficit is
the extent to which the deficit is financed  in a sustainable  manner; the inflation rate is a more
accurate indicator of internal imbalance  in this respect.  Significance  levels remain low
(never reaching the 5 percent level), however.  Further, the estimated  impact  is not as large
as might be expected. At the sample mean inflation rate and per capita central budget
infrastructure expenditure  level, the elasticity  is only -0.12.
8.  External Balance
There is some evidence that the external balance modestly  influences  per capita
central budget expenditures  on infrastructure. As can be seen in Tables 6 and 7 and
Appendix B, although  significance  levels are low (generally  only 10 percent level), a better
external balance exerts a positive influence  on infrastructure  expenditures. Significance
levels are generally  highest in regressions accounting  for the importance  of commercial  bank
flows in total foreign savings flows and lowest in regressions  accounting  for the importance
of direct foreign investment  in total foreign savings flows.
The magnitude  of the estimated  impact  varies somewhat  across specifications,
although  it is never large.  In the FCINFPA base regressions  including total foreign savings
alone, the estimated  coefficient  implies an increase in per capita central government
expenditures  ranging from (1980)  US $ 0.23 (Table 6) to $ 0.30 (Table 7) for every
percentage  point increase in TBWTGDPL. The estimated  impact increases to (1980)  US $
0.33 and $ 0.38 in Tables 6 and 7, respectively,  when the magnitude  of commercial  bank
flows are included, but decreases  to (1980) US $ 0.17 and $ 0.25 in Tables 6 and 7,
respectively, when the relative importance  of direct foreign investment  is included.  The
estimated  impact is about half the above amounts in the base regressions using FCINFPP and
FCINFGDP.  It is uniformly somewhat  higher when level of development  is measured  in
purchasing power parity terms (GDPCAP2).
One's conclusion concerning  the importance  of the external balance for infrastructure
expenditures  is also sensitive  to how the external balance is measured, as can be seen from
Table B5 in Appendix  B.  When the trade balance is measured as the black market foreign
exchange premium, significance  levels are somewhat  greater.  Still, the estimated  impact is
small with a 1 percentage  point increase in the black market foreign exchange  premium
leading to only about a (1980)  US $ 0.02 decrease  in per capita central government
infrastructure expenditures. When the external  balance is measured  as DOLLAR4, no
significant  impact is found.- 29 -
Overall,  the external balance  does not appear to be an important determinant  of per
capita central budget  expenditures  on infrastructure. The opposing forces at work appear to
more or less offset each other.
9.  Size of Foreign Sector
There is strong evidence  that countries with large foreign sectors allocate significantly
more to infrastructure expenditures,  as hypothesized. TVALX2 is significantly  positive in all
regressions, as can be seen from Tables 6 and 7 and Appendix B.  With very few exceptions,
the estimated  coefficient  is significant  at better than the 1 percent level.  The estimated
magnitude  of the impact is also sizable. A one percentage  point increase in exports plus
imports as a percentage of GDP leads to approximately  a (1980) US $ 0.50 increase in per
capita central government  expenditures  on infrastructure, implying  an elasticity  of 0.60 at the
sample means of TVALX2  and BTACCAPK. The precise magnitude  of the estimated  impact
varies somewhat  across model specifications,  although, in general, the magnitudes  are
comparable.
10.  Terms of Trade Shocks
The estimated impact  of a terms of trade shock on infrastructure expenditures  is not
as hypothesized. Rather than a strictly positive relationship, an inverted U relationship
between changes in the terms of trade and central government  expenditures  on infrastructure
is found.  As can be seen from Tables 6 and 7 and Appendix  B, the signs of both the linear
and quadratic terms are always negative. Infrastructure  investments  are greatest when the
deterioration  in the terms of trade is about 9 percent. Infrastructure expenditures  decrease
when the terms of trade deteriorate  by a greater amount or an improvement  in the terms of
trade is experienced. Governments  appear to respond to fairly modest deteriorations  in the
terms of trade, by increasing  infrastructure  investments,  perhaps in an effort to increase
profit margins and stimulate  export levels so as to maintain  foreign exchange  earnings.
When the terms of trade deteriorate  by a substantial  amount, however, this approach is either
viewed as inadequate  to maintain  foreign exchange  earnings, or infeasible, given decreases in
tax revenues.  Improvements  in the terms of trade lead to reduced infrastructure
expenditures;  perhaps because profit margins and foreign exchange earnings are viewed as
adequate, easing the pressure to improve existing infrastructure.
Significance  levels of the estimated  coefficients  are, however, low.  The linear term is
only significant  at the 15 percent level, at best, while the quadratic  term is typically  only
significant  at the 10 percent level.  Even if taken as significant, the estimated coefficients
indicate the impact of terms of trade shocks  is small. The estimated  coefficient  in Table 6,
including the total savings flow alone, indicates that at the sample mean a one percentage
point improvement  in the terms of trade (from a negative  value of -2.31 to -1.31) would only
decrease  per capita central budget  infrastructure expenditures  by (1980)  US $ 0.07.  The
estimated  elasticity at the sample  mean is only 0.01.  This relative lack of sensitivity  could
also reflect the long planning  periods for infrastructure  investments.- 30 -
11.  Debt Obligations
Contrary to expectations,  the results indicate that central budget infrastructure
expenditures  are insulated  from cuts induced  by debt service obligations. In fact, the
evidence indicates larger debt service obligations  induce slightly greater infrastructure
expenditures,  especially when commercial  bank loans and direct foreign investment  are
relatively large components  in current foreign savings flows.  Both the significance  level and
the estimated magnitude  of the impact are greater in the regressions including  the size of
current net resource flows from foreign commercial  banks and the magnitude  of direct
foreign investment  relative to GDP, as can be seen in Tables 6, 7, BI, B2, B3, B4, B5 and
B7.  Table 6 indicates  that when direct foreign investment  as a percentage of GDP is
included  in the regression, the estimated  coefficient  for DSGDP indicates that for every one
percentage  point increase in debt service relative to GDP, central budget per capita
infrastructure expenditures  increase  by (1980) US $ 0.58.  This figure increases  to (1980) US
$ 0.70 when net commercial  bank flows as a percentage  of GDP are included  in the
regression.  The corresponding  elasticity values at the sample mean values of DSGDP and
BTACCAPK  are 0.22 and 0.27.  (All figures calculated  on the basis of the FCINFPA base
regressions.)
This finding is not fully robust.  Significance  levels are low and frequently fail to
reach the 15 percent level when the total magnitude  of foreign savings alone or the relative
magnitude  of official net transfers, relative to GDP are included  in the regressions.  In the
regressions  considering  alternative measures  of sectoral balance (B2), the coefficient  on
DSGDP is only significant  when foreign flows are entirely excluded  from the regression or
the importance  of commercial  bank flows is included. It is seldom significant  with the
alternative  poverty indicators are included  in the regression (Table B8).  Further, findings  are
sensitive to how debt service obligations  are measured. As Table B6 shows, if debt
obligations  are measured as the debt service ratio (TDS), the coefficients  on TDS are
insignificant  in the regressions  including total net transfers alone and the magnitude  of
official transfers.  Further, if debt obligations  are measured as the total long term debt as a
percentage of GDP (DODGDP1),  the estimated  coefficients  are negative  and insignificant  in
all five regressions.
12.  Institutional Development
The level of institutional  development  is a significant  and important determinant  of
per capita central budget  expenditures  on infrastructure. The coefficient  for GASTIL is
negative  indicating  that the greater the degree of institutional  development,  the greater are
expenditures  on infrastructure. Significance  levels are, with very few exceptions, at the one
percent level or better.  The only contrary evidence occurs when the altemative measures  of
sectoral balance  are used or when incidence  of poverty measures  are substituted  for poverty
commitment. In both these cases, however, the substitutions  appear to result in specification
bias.- 31 -
The estimated sign of the coefficient  in the base regression sets (rables 6 & 7)
indicates that a one unit increase in the value of GASTIL (indicating  poorer institutional
development)  results in approximately  a (1980)  US $ 2.50 decrease in per capita central
budget expenditures. The implied elasticity  at the sample mean values for GASTIL and
BTACCAPK  is just over -0.60.  There is some variation in the estimated  magnitude  of the
impact  across specifications. Excluding  the anomalous  cases mentioned  above, the estimated
impact  of a one unit increase in the value of GASTIL is between (1980) US$-2.00 and US$-
3.50.
13.  Level and Mix of External Funding
Central budget per capita infrastructure  expenditures  are positively associated  with
foreign savings flows. 12 In all regressions including  net per capita savings flows alone,
NFFCAP1K  has a positive coefficient  which, with few exceptions, is significant  at the 1
percent level, as can be seen from Tables 6 and 7 and Appendix  B.  External funding
remains a significantly  positive determinant  of central budget  per capita infrastructure
expenditures  regardless of whether or not IMF credit is included  in the tally of foreign
savings flows, as can be seen from Table B7.  The estimated  magnitude  of the impact is,
however, quite small and amounts to only (1980) US $ 0.02 for every (1980) US $1.00
increase in net per capita foreign savings. At the sample mean values of NFFCAP1K  and
BTACCAPK  the elasticity  is 0.06.  The estimated  magnitude  of the impact is surprisingly
stable across all sensitivity  analyses.
The mix of foreign funding  influences  infrastructure  expenditures. In particular,
holding the total magnitude  of foreign funding  constant, commercial  bank flows induce
increased infrastructure expenditures,  while, contrary to expectations,  the relationship
between direct foreign investment  and per capita central budget infrastructure expenditures  is
U shaped. Infrastructure expenditures  fall with increases in direct foreign investment  until
the level of direct foreign investment  reaches about 1.4 percent of GDP; per capita
infrastructure investment  only increases with increases  in direct foreign investment  in
countries where the level of direct foreign investment  is about one standard deviation  above
the mean sample value.  Countries receiving  a high percentage of foreign savings as official
transfers do not spend any more or less on infrastructure than other countries  receiving the
same magnitude  of total foreign funding.  Again, this latter finding  is insensitive  to whether
official flows are defined to include or exclude  IMF credit, as can be seen from Table B7.
14.  Government Objectives  - Poveny Commitment
The results indicate that a government's  commitment  to poverty alleviation  influences
per capita central government  infrastructure  expenditures. The effect follows an inverted-U
pattern.  Initially as commitment  to poverty alleviation  increases, per capita central budget
expenditures  on infrastructure increase as well.  Once the level of commitment  to poverty
alleviation  reaches a certain threshold, however, a further increase in commitment  leads to
decreased  expenditures  on infrastructure. This suggests that governments  with some, but- 32 -
limited, commitment  to poverty alleviation  adopt strategies focused  on increasing the poor's
productivity  through infrastructure investments,  but that as the commitment  to poverty
alleviation  intensifies  the strategy shifts to one either fostering the poor's human  capital
accumulation  or emphasizing  the provision of a social safety net and that funding  for these
strategies  competes with funding for infrastructure  provision.
This finding is quite robust.  As Tables 6, 7 and Bl show, both the linear and
quadratic  terms are with few exceptions  significant  at the 5 percent level or better in all base
regressions, except when the total capital stock is used to proxy for the stock of
infrastructure. In this case both variables only reach significance  at the 15 percent level.
The result extends  across sensitivity  analyses. As can be seen in Tables B2 through  B7, both
the linear and quadratic  poverty commitment  terms are significant  at the 5 percent level or
better.  The only exception  occurs when the level of development  is measured in purchasing
power parity terms (GDPCP2);  in this case, PCOM and PCOMSQ  are insignificant,  but
carry the appropriate signs.  Peak expenditures  on infrastructure  occur when the degree of
poverty commitment  is close to the sample mean. Based on the regression measuring
infrastructure stocks as road and rail kilometers  per 100 square kilometers land area and
including total foreign funds alone (Table 6, M2), the peak contribution  to per capita central
budget infrastructure expenditures  occurs when PCOM equals 3.55, while the sample mean
value of PCOM is 3.44.  The effect is also substantial. When PCOM equals 3.55, it
independently  accounts for US 1980 $ 14.36 of total per capita central budget expenditures
on infrastructure. In countries  where there is overwhelming  evidence  of a strong and
credible commitment  to poverty alleviation  (PCOM=5) and where there is no evidence of
any commitment  to poverty alleviation  (PCOM= 1), the comparable  figures are US 1980 $
12.00 and $ 6.00, respectively.
A comparison  of the regressions  including  and excluding PCOM from the regression
provides further evidence of the influence  of a country's commitment  to poverty alleviation
on central budget infrastructure  expenditures.  As Table B8 shows, when poverty
commitment  is excluded from the regressions, the adjusted R 2 falls and the significance  levels
of some variables change.  In particular, the quadratic  term on level of development
(GDPCPKSQ)  becomes  insignificant  and its sign changes.  The external balance variable
(TBWTGDPL)  also becomes  insignificant,  although  in this case it carries the correct sign.
The significance  levels of several other variables change; the debt burden variable (DSGDP)
becomes  less significant, while the effect of terms or trade shocks is more significant,  and,
holding total foreign funding flows constant, official foreign funding  flows negatively
influence  central budget per capita infrastructure expenditures. The changes  in the adjusted
R2 and significance  levels along with differences  in the coefficient  estimates  suggest the
model is misspecified  when poverty commitment  is excluded from the regression.
The regressions in Table B8 replacing  poverty commitment  with poverty levels
indicate it is commitment  to poverty alleviation, rather than the poverty level that matters.
Despite the fact that all of the poverty measures  are positively  and significantly  correlated
(see Table 1), the effect of the poverty level on infrastructure  expenditures  differs depending- 33 -
upon the poverty measure used.  When the United  Nations Development  Program's poverty
line is used to measure poverty, a significant  inverted U relationship  is found which peaks at
a poverty incidence  of about 17 percent (about one half the sample mean incidence).
However, when any of the other estimates  of the incidence  of poverty are substituted  for
PCOM in the regressions, none of the poverty coefficient  estimates  is significantly  different
from zero.  Further, the signs of the estimated coefficients  are unstable. For WBPOOR  and
P2085, the coefficient  signs indicate an inverted U relationship,  while for P3085 and P6085,
a U shaped relationship  is implied.  Finally, when any of the measures  of poverty incidence
is substituted for poverty commitment,  the significance  levels of the other regressors are
affected as are the coefficient  magnitudes;  just which coefficient  estimates  are affected differs
across the alternative  measures  of poverty.  These results indicate that estimates  of the
incidence  of poverty cannot be used as a proxy for a government's commitment  to poverty
alleviation.
Government  objectives  do influence  infrastructure  expenditures  as the results for
poverty commitment  show.  Appropriate  indices of government  objectives  need to be
developed  to fully explain expenditure  patterns.  Further work to define  and refine indicators
along the lines of our PCOM variable are warranted.
15.  Central Budget Per Capita  Infrastructure Expenditures: Summary and Conclusions
Table 8 summarizes  the overall results of the analysis.  The table shows the
hypothesized  relationship  between the different  variables and per capita central government
expenditures,  and the direction of the estimated  relationship. The instantaneous  rate of
change in infrastructure  expenditures  and the elasticity are shown as computed for the sample
mean values of the independent  and dependent  variables. In the case of nonlinear
relationships, the estimated  peak or trough is indicated.  The values without  parentheses  are
those corresponding  to Table 6's FCINFPA base regression  including foreign funding, M2,
(and, except where relevant, excluding  the mix of foreign funding), while the values in
parentheses  are those corresponding  to the comparable  regression  including the dummy
variables for year (Table 7).- 34 -
Table 8.  Central Budget Infrastructure  Expeditures  Summary Overall Results
Hypothesized  Estimated  Instantaneous Effect  Peak or  Elasticity
Variable  Relationship  Relationship  Effect I unit  ncreaew  Trough  at Mean
Stock of Infruatrcture
FCINFPA  ?  >0  $ 0.01  - 0.23
(S0.01)  (0.16)
Population Density
DENS & DENSSQ  7  Inverted U  $ 0.04  161  0.24
(S 0.04)  (162)  (0.24)
Urbanization
URBAN4  <0  <0  S-0.46  - -1.10
($-0.47)  (-1.12)
Sectorul  Imbalance
MIGZ  >0  >0  $4.55  - 0.41
($4.47)  (0.40)
Labor Porce Participation
LFPER  ?  <0  $-1.32  - -2.73
(S-1.33)  (-2.73)
Level of Developmernt
ODPCAPK & GDPCPKSQ  >0  /Inverted U  Inverted U  $0.26  $4282  1.69
($0.26)  (4340)  (1.68)
Internal Balance
BBGDPL  ?  N.S.  - - -
INFL4  & INPL4SQ  ?  U Shaped  $-0.09  230  -0.12
Exteral  Balance
TBWTGDPL  ?  >0  $ 0.23  - -0.05
(S 0.30)J  (40.07)
BLACK  ?  <0  $-0.02  - -0.04
DOLLAR4  ?  M.S.  - - -
Size Foreign Sector
TVALX2  >0  >0  S 48.96  - 0.60
(S 47.29)  (0.58)
Ternm of Trade  Shock
TOTS &TOTSSQ  >0  Inverted U  S-0.07  -9.31  0.01
(S-0.08)  (-9.64)  (0.01)
Debt Obligations
DSGDP  <0  >0  $ 0.36  - 0.13
($ 0.50)  0.19
Institutional Development
GASTIL  ?  <0  S-2.52  -0.62
(S-2.47)  (-0.61)
Level  Foreign Funding
NFFCAPIK  >0  >0  $ 0.02  _  0.06
(S 0.02)  (0.05)
Mix  of Foreign  Funding
NOFGDPI  ?  N.S.  - - -
NCBGDPI  ?  >0  $ 1.29  - 0.06
($ 1.22)  (0.06)
DFICDP & DFIGDPSQ  >0  U Shaped  S-1.60  $1.42  -0.06
($-1.64)  ($1.40)  (-0.06)
Poveity Commitmnrd
PCOM & PCOMSQ  ?  Inveited U  $ 0.25  3.55  0.05
($ 0.38)  (3.62)  (0.07)- 35 -
Among all of the factors hypothesized  to potentially  influence  per capita central
budgetary infrastructure expenditures,  only two are found to have no influence. First,
holding  the level of foreign funding  constant, official transfers neither increase nor decrease
central budget per capita infrastructure expenditures. This finding is robust across all models
and sensitivity  analyses. Second, the internal balance, as measured  by the budget balance as
a percentage of GDP lagged one year, has no influence  on current infrastructure
expenditures. This result suggests that any tendency to postpone  infrastructure investments
in the context of high budget deficits is offset by a conscious  policy fostering infrastructure
investment  or an inability to reduce budgetary allocations  for infrastructure. The explanation
for this latter possibility may be the long gestation  period between the planning  and
implementation  phase for infrastructure investments  and bonding practices which effectively
protect infrastructure expenditures. The finding that the internal balance has no influence  on
current infrastructure expenditures  is not, however, robust.  If the internal balance is
measured  by the rate of inflation, infrastructure expenditures  are found to fall (at a
decreasing  rate) as the budget  balance deteriorates. This suggests that infrastructure
expenditures  are not fully protected, despite bonding  practices;  when the budget deficit
becomes  unsustainable  and governments  increasingly  have to resort to printing money  to
finance their deficit, infrastructure expenditures  become a target of budget cuts.
For many of the variables hypothesized  to influence  per capita infrastructure
expenditures  (stock of infrastructure, population  density, labor force participation  rate,
internal balance, external balance, institutional  development,  official flows, commercial  bank
flows and poverty commitment),  no a priori hypothesis  concerning  the direction of the
relationship  could be made, given the opposing  forces at work.  However, for eight variables
(urbanization,  urban-rural imbalance, level of development,  size of foreign sector, terms of
trade shift, debt obligations,  level of foreign funding  and direct foreign investment),  a priori
hypotheses  could be made.  The estimated  results fully bear out the hypotheses  in the case of
five variables (urbanization,  level of development,  urban-rural balance, size of the foreign
sector, level of foreign funding), only partially bear out the hypotheses  in the case of two
variables (terms of trade shifts and direct foreign investment),  and contradict the hypothesis
in the case of one variable (debt obligations).
The negative  relationship  hypothesized  and found between the urbanization  rate and
per capita central government  infrastructure expenditures  is highly significant  and robust
across models  and sensitivity  analyses. A positive or inverted U relationship  between the
level of development  and per capita infrastructure  expenditures  was hypothesized  and is
substantiated. When the level of development  across countries is compared on the basis of
exchange rate conversions  (GDPCAPK)  and in constant 1980 dollars, a highly significant
inverted  U relationship  is found, peaking at approximately  US 1980  $ 4300.  However, when
purchasing power parity conversions  are used (GDPCAP2),  more accurately  reflecting
differences  in standards  of living across countries, a strictly positive linear relationship  is
found.  The hypothesized  positive relationship  between the extent of the urban-rural
imbalance, size of the foreign sector, and level of foreign funding  on the one hand and per
capita infrastructure  expenditures  on the other is confirmed  by the analyses. These- 36 -
relationships  are fully robust and the estimated  magnitudes  are similar across models. The
only qualification  is that alternative measures  of the urban-rural  imbalance  (which are
deemed inferior measures)  do not fully substantiate  the hypothesis.
A positive relationship  between a terms of trade shock and per capita infrastructure
expenditures  was hypothesized. The estimated relationship  is an inverted U, peaking when
the terms of trade deteriorate  by approximately  nine percent, so that the hypothesized
positive relationship  only holds when there is a very serious deterioration  in the terms of
trade.  It fails to hold when the terms of trade improve.  Further, the significance  of the
coefficients  is low.  It was hypothesized  that when direct foreign investment  was an
important source of foreign funding, central budget infrastructure  expenditures  would be
larger.  The hypothesized  positive relationship  between direct foreign investment  and
infrastructure expenditures  only holds when direct foreign investment  is a very large
percentage of GDP (nearly a full standard deviation  above the sample mean value).  The
estimated  U shaped relationship  found indicates that for most countries, increased direct
foreign investment  actually induces lower central budget expenditures  on infrastructure. It
may be that, in the general case, foreign investors directly provide infrastructure  which
governments  otherwise  would have provided;  only when direct foreign investment  is seen as
a key element in the development  strategy and a serious effort is made to attract foreign
investment  via the establishment  of export platforms does direct foreign investment  increase
government  infrastructure expenditures.
Contrary to what was hypothesized,  countries with large debt obligations  spend more
on infrastructure. The negative relationship  hypothesized  was premised on the assumption
that debt servicing receives priority over other expenditure  categories. While it is unlikely
that "discretionary"  expenditures  dominate  debt servicing  in the allocation of funds, the
findings  indicate that infrastructure expenditures  are protected  even in the face of large debt
service obligations. It may be that governments  choose to protect infrastructure investments,
and scale back other discretionary  expenditures,  given the link between infrastructure
development  and export capacity;  exports are necessary  to earn the foreign exchange required
to service the debt.  The finding is not fully robust.  When debt obligations  are measured
relative to exports (TDS) as opposed to GDP (DSGDP), significance  levels fall and the
estimated  coefficient  is insignificant  in some models.  When the total debt as a proportion of
GDP is used (DODGDP), the estimated  coefficient  is never significant  and, in fact, carries
the hypothesized  sign.
For nine of the variables hypothesized  to influence  per capita infrastructure
expenditures  (stock of infrastructure, population  density, labor force participation  rate,
internal balance, external balance, institutional  development,  official flows, commercial  bank
flows and poverty commitment),  no a priori hypothesis  could be made concerning  the nature
of the relationship  given the opposing  forces at work.  As noted above, no significant
relationship  is found between either the internal balance or official foreign funding  flows on
the one hand and infrastructure  expenditures  on the other.  The findings indicate that greater
per capita central budget infrastructure  expenditures  result when the stock of infrastructure is- 37 -
larger, the external balance improves, institutional  development  is better or commercial  bank
flows are a larger component  of foreign funding  flows.  While the findings  for institutional
development  and commercial  bank flows are fully robust, those for the stock of infrastructure
and the external balance are not.  For the stock of infrastructure, the hypothesis  holds when a
narrow definition  of infrastructure is adopted (roads plus rail kilometers); no significant
relationship  is found when the stock of infrastructure is measured  broadly as the total capital
stock.  Concerning  the external balance, the magnitude  of the estimate is sensitive  to the
model used and how the level of development  and infrastructure stock are measured.
Further, when DOLLAR4 replaces TBWTGDPL,  no significant  relationship  is found.
The findings  robustly indicate expenditures  decrease with higher labor force
participation  rates.  Finally, the findings indicate that as the population  density and degree of
poverty commitment  increase, central budget per capita infrastructure expenditures  initially
increase, but subsequently  decrease.  For population  density, the peak of the inverted U
occurs at density levels considerably  greater than the sample mean population  density; for
poverty commitment,  the peak occurs when poverty commitment  levels are near the sample
mean.  Both of these findings are robust.  It should be noted, again, that the level of poverty
is an inappropriate  proxy for the degree of poverty commitment.
The elasticity estimates  presented in Table 8 provide considerable  guidance
concerning  which factors have the greatest influence  on per capita central government
infrastructure expenditures. The urbanization  rate, labor force participation  rate and level of
development  are the most important  determinants  of infrastructure  expenditures  and all have
elasticities  greater than 1 in absolute value at the sample mean. The urban-rural  balance,
size of the foreign sector and institutional  development  have a substantial  impact on per
capita central government  infrastructure expenditures  with elasticity  estimates  between 0.4
and 1.0 in absolute value at the sample mean. The stock of infrastructure, population  density
and debt obligations  only exert a small influence  on central govemment  infrastructure
expenditures;  elasticity  estimates for these variables are between 0.3 and 0.1 in absolute
value at the sample mean.  Finally, the extemal balance, terms of trade shocks, poverty
commitment,  level of foreign funding, commercial  bank flows and direct foreign investment
only have a tiny impact on central government  infrastructure  expenditures, with elasticity
estimates  below 0.1 at the sample mean.
C.  Determinants  of Per Capita Consolidated Budget  Expenditures  on Infrastructure
Appendix  C presents the signs and significance  levels of variables for all sensitivity
analyses undertaken  to isolate the determinants  of per capita consolidated  budget expenditures
on infrastructure without  any correction for autocorrelation.' 3 All regressions are highly
significant  with adjusted R 2s ranging from .66 to .82, but typically  in the .69 to .74 range.
Five of the variables thought to influence  per capita infrastructure expenditures  are generally
insignificant. Terms of trade shocks  appear to have no influence  on consolidated  budget per
capita infrastructure  expenditures, nor do debt obligations,  or the degree of poverty
commitment. After controlling  for the total level of foreign funding flows, official flows,- 38 -
whether defined to include IMF credits or not, have no impact on consolidated  budget
infrastructure expenditures. The trade balance, per se, has no influence  on consolidated
budget expenditures,  although other indicators suggest the external balance may be of some
consequence. The sensitivity  of consolidated  budgetary  outlays on infrastructure to the
existing stock of infrastructure  depends upon how the stock is measured, while the other
eleven variables are robustly significant  across all base runs, although  there are some minor
variations across runs in the magnitude  of their impact. Except for sensitivity  analyses
exploring the role of the external balance, all sensitivity  analyses confirm the basic
relationships  found in the base runs.
1.  Stock of Infrastructure
Table Cl in Appendix C presents the signs and significance  levels of variables for the
alternative  OLS base regressions.  As for the central budget  estimates, four different bases
are considered, differing  by how the stock of infrastructure  is measured. For each
alternative  base, five regressions  are included:  MI excludes  the influence  of foreign savings,
M2 includes the level of foreign savings, but ignores the mix, M3, M4 and MS explore how
the mix of foreign savings flows (official, commercial  bank, and direct foreign investment,
respectively),  influence  per capita consolidated  infrastructure  expenditures.
The effect of the stock of infrastructure  on per capita consolidated  budget
infrastructure  expenditures  is sensitive  to how the stock of infrastructure  is measured. As for
central budget  expenditures, when the infrastructure stock is measured  broadly as K02,  no
significant  relationship  is found.  However, when the infrastructure  stock is measured
narrowly as the kilometers of roads and rail, the coefficient  is always positive, although  not
significantly  so when the stock of roads and railways is measured  relative to GDP per capita.
The estimated  coefficients  are larger than found for central government  expenditures  when
the stock is measured  relative to land area and GDP per capita, but slightly smaller, when
measured  relative to the population. As in the central budget  estimates, the effect is
nonlinear when measured relative to the population.
A one kilometer  increase in the stock of roads and rail per thousand square kilometers
land area increases infrastructure  expenditures  by about US 1980 $0.02 per capita (as
opposed to 0.01).  A one kilometer  increase in the stock  per US 1980 $ GDP increases per
capita infrastructure expenditures  by about four tenths of a cent.  At the sample mean, the
estimated  elasticities  are 0.25, 0.04 and 0.21 when the stock of roads and railways are
measured  relative to the land area, GDP and the population, respectively.  These magnitudes
are similar to those found for central government  expenditures.
Overall, a conclusion  that the stock of infrastructure  increases per capita consolidated
infrastructure  expenditures  by a less than proportionate  amount is warranted. The impact  of
expenditures  needed to offset depreciation  of the existing infrastructure stock and/or
complementarity  between infrastructure  and the structure of the economy, more than fully
offsets the effect of diminishing  returns to infrastructure  expenditures.- 39 -
As was found for central government  expenditures,  the significance  of other variables
as determinants  of per capita infrastructure expenditure  is quite robust across the alternative
bases.  Because  the regressions defining the stock of infrastructure  as the total kilometers  of
road and rail per 1000 square kilometers  land area, FCINFPA, perform marginally better
overall, this definition  also will be used as the base for the sensitivity  analyses exploring the
determinants  of consolidated  budget per capita infrastructure  expenditures. The full results
of the five regressions (MI through M5) using FCINFPA to define the stock of infrastructure
are shown in Table 9.
The results shown in Table 9 do not include any correction for possible
autocorrelation. Table 10 provides the basis for our test for autocorrelation. Table 10 shows
the results of the same regression set, but includes dummy variables for year.  As before,
Y81 is set equal to 1 if the observation  is from 1981, but zero otherwise, and so on; the
omitted year is 1980. There is no evidence  of autocorrelation.  The F values for the joint
significance  tests of the dummy variables for year are 0.51, 0.42, 0.47, 0.35, and 0.62, for
models Ml,  M2, M3, M4, and M5, respectively. The critical FQ-K,,-  value at the 20 percent
significance  level is greater than 1.40 in all cases.  Further, the coefficient  magnitudes  are
quite comparable  between estimates, as are significance  levels for the independent  variables.
As before, in the absence of any evidence of autocorrelation,  the sensitivity  analyses are
undertaken  excluding  any control for the year of observation.
2.  Population Density
As can be seen from Tables 9 and 10 and Appendix  C, population  density is
significant  at the .01 level or better in all base runs and all sensitivity  analyses with the
exception  of those including  poverty level as opposed to poverty commitment.  The
relationship  is strictly negative (whereas  an inverted  U relationship  was found in the central
budget case);  higher population  densities  are associated  with lower per capita consolidated
budget infrastructure  expenditures.  The estimated sign reflects the fact that high population
densities necessitate  lower expenditure  for a given level of infrastructure service.  In the
consolidated  budget case, this factor offsets any tendency for economies  of scale to dictate a
high optimal level of provision in more densely populated  countries.
At the sample mean the estimated  elasticity  calculated  from Table 9 is -.33, opposite
in sign and somewhat  larger in magnitude  than that found for central budget expenditures.
At the sample mean, population  density  decreases infrastructure  expenditures  by about (1980)
US $ 6.43.  The size of the estimated  impact  is somewhat  smaller (in absolute value) in the
case of the alternative  bases and the sensitivity  analyses utilizing alternative  indicators of the
sectoral  imbalance, but somewhat  larger in the sensitivity  analyses measuring  development
level in purchasing  power parity dollars, measuring  debt obligations  as DODGDP1, and
measuring  the external balance as DOLLAR4,  as well as in the runs using HDRPOOR  and
WBPOOR. Overall, the differences  in the size of the estimated  coefficients  found are not
large.- 40 -
Table  9.  Consolidated  Budget  Base Infrastructure  Regressions
Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model  3  Model 4  Model 5
INTERCEPT  52.06  48.81  48.21-  56.57  56.22-
(3.99)  (3.91)  (3.83)  (4.54)  (4.64)
FCINFPA  1.91E-2-  1.97E-2-  1.95E-2  2.15E-2  2.08E-2-
(3.24)  (3.49)  (3.43)  (3.89)  (3.82)
GDPCAPK  2.80E-2-  3.13E-2"  3.18E-2-  2.94E-2-  2.89E-2-
(4.40)  (5.10)  (5.07)  (4.89)  (4.87)
GDPCPKSQ  -1.76E-6  -3.05E-6  -3.01E-6  -2.89E-6  -2.48E-6
(-0.92)  (-1.65)  (-1.62)  (-1.60)  (-1.39)
DENS  -6.40E-2  -5.92E-2-  -5.84E-2~  -5.89E-2  -5.48E-2-
(-5.94)  (-5.72)  (-5.50)  (-5.84)  (-5.36)
URBAN4  -5.33E-1-  -5.47E-1  -5.62E-1  -5.37E-1  -5.77E-1l
(-4.52)  (-4.86)  (-4.73)  (-4.90)  (-5.33)
MIGZ  6.64  6.35  6.38  6.98  ~  6.64-
(3.52)  (3.53)  (3.53)  (3.96)  (3.85)
MIGZSQ  -5.90E-1  -5.76E-1-  -5.82E-1  -6.30E-1  -6.14E-1
(-2.93)  (-2.99)  (-3.01)  (-3.35)  (-3.33)
LFPER  -8.07E-1-  -7.89E-1  -7.83E-1  -8.85E-1-  -7.6lE-1
(-3.29)  (-3.37)  (-3.33)  (-3.74)  (-3.40)
BBGDPL  -4.27E-1-  -5.14E-1  -5. IOE-1  -4.57E-1-  -3.47E-1-
(-1.98)  (-2.48)  (-2.45)  (-2.26)  (-1.70)
TVALX2  28.64-  21.68  19.38'  17.45'  9.09
(3.02)  (2.34)  (1.78)  (1.91)  (0.91)
TBWTGDPL  -8.58E-2  -4.30E-2  -3.35E-2  -2.91E-2  -1.14E-1
(-0.58)  (-0.31)  (-0.23)  (-0.21)  (-0.82)
TOTS  6.65E-2  8.15E-2  8.19E-2  8.04E-2  6.60E-2
(0.78)  (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.02)  (0.71)
DSGDP  -9.20E-3  -3.69E-1  -3.60E-1  -4.18E-1  1.29E-1
(-0.03)  (-1.11)  (-1.08)  (-1.29)  (0.37)- 41 -
Table 9 (Con't).  Consolidated Budget Base Infrastructure Regressions
Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5
GASTIL  -12.42  -11.49  -11.35  -12.94  -12.83-
(-3.56)  (-3.44)  (-3.36)  (-3.92)  (-3.98)
GASTILSQ  1.40  1.35  1.33-  1.50-  1.47-
(3.22)  (3.25)  (3.19)  (3.68)  (3.70)
PCOM  7.87E-2  1.52E-1  1.92E-1  -1.78E-1  -5.11E-1
(0.08)  (0.16)  (0.20)  (-0.19)  (-0.55)
NFFCAP1K  - 3.17E-2  3.04E-2  2.99E-2-  3.05E-27
(3.51)  (3.14)  (3.39)  (3.36)
NOFGDP1  - - 1.85E-1  -
(0.41)
NCBGDPSQ  - - - 3.OOE-1-  -
(2.75)
DFIGDP  - - - - 4.489
(-2.55)
DFIGDPSQ  - - - - 1.52-
(3.43)
R
2 0.7308  0.7571  0.7574  0.7723  0.7815
Adjusted  R2 0.6934  0.7208  0.7188  0.7360  0.7444
F-Value  19.515  20.897  19.601  21.287  21.083
N  132  132  132  132  132
Significant  at the .01 level
Significant  at the .05 level
Significant  at the .10 level
3.  Urbanization
Urbanization  reduces per capita consolidated  budget infrastructure expenditures,
ceteris  paribus, as hypothesized  and was found for central budget expenditures. As can be
seen from Tables 9 and 10 and from Appendix  C, the estimated  coefficient  for URBAN4  is
significantly  negative at the 1 percent level in all base runs and sensitivity  analyses except the
estimates  replacing  PCOM with HDRPOOR  and WBPOOR  where the significance  levels are
somewhat  lower.  The estimated  elasticity  at the sample mean is -1.15, marginally  greater- 42 -
than was found for central budget infrastructure  expenditures.  A one percentage  point
increase  in the urbanization  rate reduces per capita consolidated  budget expenditures  on
infrastructure  by approximately  (1980)  US $ 0.55, also marginally  more than was found for
central budget expenditures. Although there is virtually no variation in the size of the
estimated  coefficient  across base runs, there is minor variation in the estimated  size of the
coefficient  in the sensitivity  analyses.
4.  Sectoral Balance
Consolidated  budget infrastructure expenditures  increase with the extent of the
imbalance  between rural and urban sectors, as was hypothesized.  While a strictly linear and
positive relationship  was found for the central budget, here the effect is nonlinear. However,
the peak of the inverted-U occurs when MIGZ is 5.52 (as calculated  from Table 9, M2),
more than two standard deviations  above its mean value, so that except when the imbalance
is exceptionally  pronounced, the positive relationship  holds.  The coefficient  for the rural-
urban migration  rate, MIGZ, is significant  at the 1 percent level in most regressions  and that
for its square at the 5 percent level or better as can be seen from Tables 9 and 10 and
Appendix C.  There are a few cases when these variables are not highly significant;  when
DOLLAR4  is used to measure the external balance, the quadratic  term is not significant,  and
when WBPOOR  is substituted  for PCOM, nether term is significant.
The magnitude  of the estimated  coefficients  across sensitivity  analyses is generally
between 6.0 and 7.5 for the linear term and .45 to .65 for the quadratic  term.  The
magnitude  of the estimated  coefficients  is somewhat  smaller in the alternative  bases, and
when PCOM is omitted from the regression or several of the poverty measures  are
substituted  for PCOM.  It is somewhat  greater when GDPCAP2 replaces GDPCAPK  in the
regressions  and when DOLLAR4  is used to measure the external balance, and it is
considerably  greater when HDRPOOR  replaces PCOM.  Focusing on the FCINFPA base
regression in Table 9 including foreign flows, but not the mix of foreign funding, one finds
that when the migration  rate increases  by one percentage point from the mean, per capita
consolidated  budget expenditures  on infrastructure  increase  by about (1980) US $ 4.50.  This
is the same rate of increase found for central budget infrastructure expenditures. The
estimated elasticity  at the mean is 0.37;  the comparable  figure for central budget
infrastructure  expenditures  was 0.41.- 43  -
Table  10.  Consolidated  Buget  Base Infrastructure  Regressions  with  Time Dummies
Variables  Model  1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5
INTERCEPT  53.12  49.12  48.01-  56.69-  58.00-
(4.00)  (3.85)  (3.72)  (4.43)  (4.68)
FCINFPA  2.06E-2-  1.95E-2-  1.90E-2-  2.10E-2-  2.16-2-
(3.37)  (3.33)  (3.20)  (3.65)  (3.84)
GDPCAPK  2.85E-2-  3.16E-2-  3.24E-2  2.97E-2'  2.90E-2-
(4.40)  (5.05)  (5.07)  (4.83)  (4.82)
GDPCPKSQ  -1.89E-6  -3.09E-6  -3  .03E-6  -2.93E-6  -2.49E-6
(-0.98)  (-1.64)  (-1.60)  (-1.59)  (-1.37)
DENS  -6.47E-2~  -5.90E-2  -5.74E-2  -5.82E-2"  -5.37E-2~
(-5.91)  (-5.57)  (-5.25)  (-5.64)  (-5.12)
URBAN4  -5.50E-1  -5.46E-1~  -5.69E-1  -5.34E-l  -5.92E-1~
(-4.56)  (-4.73)  (-4.70)  (-4.74)  (-5.35)
MIGZ  6.75w  6.42  6.46  6.99  6.80-
(3.52)  (3.50)  (3.51)  (3.88)  (3.88)
MIGZSQ  -5.98E-1  -5.83E-1  -5.92E-1  -6.32E-1  -6.33E-1
(-2.92)  (-2.97)  (-3.00)  (-3.29)  (-3.38)
LFPER  -8.44E-1  -7.85E-1  -7.70E-1  -8.40E-1  -7.58E-1
(-3.37)  (-3.27)  (-3.18)  (-3.57)  (-3.31)
BBGDPL  -4.02E-1*  -5.16E-1-  -5.12E-1-  -4.65E-1-  -3.52E-1
(-1.78)  (-2.36)  (-2.33)  (-2.17)  (-1.65)
TVALX2  26.27-  22.24-  18.78  18.25  4.80
(2.53)  (2.22)  (1.65)  (1.85)  (0.43)
TBWTGDPL  -4.31E-2  -7.82E-2  -7.36E-2  -7.50E-2  -1. lOE-1
(-0.26)  (-0.50)  (-0.47)  (-0.49)  (-0.72)
TOTS  6.86E-2  9.89E-2  l.OOE-1  9.59E-2  6.45E-2
(0.77)  (1.16)  (1.18)  (1.15)  (0.79)
DSGDP  6.07E-2  -4.71E-1  -4.90E-1  -5.34E-1  2.56E-1
(0.16)  (-1.20)  (-1.25)  (-1.40)  (0.61)
GASTIL  -11.74-  -11.83.  -1(1.70)  -13.339  -12.758
(-3.24)  (-3.42)  (-3.37)  (-3.90)  (-3.86)- 44  -
Table 10 (Con't).  Consolidated Buget Base Infrastructure  Regressions with Time Dummies
Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model  3  Model 4  Model 5
GASTILSQ  1.32-  1.40-  1.38-  1.55-  1.48-
(2.95)  (3.25)  (3.21)  (3.67)  (3.61)
PCOM  1.12E-1  1.66E-1  2.31E-1  -1.66E-1  -5.61E-1
(0.11)  (0.17)  (0.24)  (-0.18)  (-0.59)
NFFCAP1K  - 3.43E-2~  3.30E-2-  3.35E-2  3.03E-2-
(3.34)  (3.14)  (3.35)  (2.98)
NOFGDP1  - - 3.1OE-1  -
(0.64)
NCBGDPSQ  - - - 2.94E-1l
(2.59)
DFIGDP  - - - - -4.62
(-2.56)
DFIGDPSQ  - - - - 1.64-
(3.50)
Y81  -5.86E-1  -1.22  -1.43  -1.65  -2.75
(4..19)  (-0.41)  (-0.48)  (-0.57)  (-0.96)
Y82  3.00E-2  -2.27E-1  -3.02E-1  -1.01  -2.54
(0.01)  (-0.08)  (-0.10)  (-0.34)  (-0.85)
Y83  -1.06E-1  -6.86E-1  -6.81E-1  -9.42E-1  -3.51
(-0.03)  (-0.21)  (0.21)  (-0.30)  (-1.10)
Y84  -1.71  -1.04  -9.06E-1  -9.68E-1  -2.45
(-0.54)  (-0.34)  (-0.30)  (-0.33)  (-0.83)
Y85  2.32E-1  2.80  3.17  2.32  -1.OOE-l
(0.07)  (0.84)  (0.93)  (0.71)  (-0.03)
Y86  -4.21  -8.84E-1  -4.50E-1  -3.29E-1  -4.10
(-1.24)  (-0.26)  (-0.13)  (-0.10)  (-1.22)
R2 0.7381  0.7627  0.7636  0.7767  0.7889
Adjusted  R2 0.6853  0.7122  0.7186  0.7267  0.7391
F-Value  13.965  15.091  14.401  15.511  15.841
N  132  132  132  132  132
Significant  at the .01 level
Significant  at the .05 level
Significant  at the .10 level- 45 -
The findings  are sensitive  to how the sectoral  balance is measured, as can be seen
from Table C2 in Appendix  C.  The share of GDP in the agricultural sector, SAGR4
positively influences  consolidated  budget per capita infrastructure expenditures,  implying  as
the sectoral balance  improves, infrastructure expenditures  increase rather than decrease.  As
the level of agricultural  income increases, consolidated  infrastructure expenditures  initially
increase, but subsequently  decrease.  The peak of the inverted U relationship  occurs when
AGCAPK  equals US (1980) $ 1238, over three standard deviations  above the sample mean
value, implying that over the sample range this relationship  is positive as well, contrary to
expectations. The same anomaly was found for central government  infrastructure
expenditures. As was noted then, these proxies for rural welfare measure differences
between rural and urban welfare levels less effectively  than migration  rates, since as the level
of development  increases, the share of income earned in rural areas from agricultural
activities tends to decrease.  Neither SAGR4  nor AGCAPK  accounts  for this fact or for
differences  in social service provision between sectors.
5.  Labor Force Padicipation Rate
The sign of the coefficient  on the labor force participation  rate, LFPER, is robustly
negative, and with few exceptions  significant  at the 1 percent level.  As was the case for
central budget infrastructure  expenditures,  consolidated  budget infrastructure  expenditures
decrease as the labor force participation  rate increases.  As before, the findings  imply that
labor and public infrastructure  are net substitutes  in production  and/or that, ceteris  paribus,
higher population  growth rates induce higher per capita expenditures  on infrastructure.
The magnitude  of the impact of the labor force participation  rate is substantial. When
the labor force participation  rate increases  by one percentage  point, consolidated  budget  per
capita infrastructure expenditures  typically  decrease by about (1980) US $ 0.80 as can be
seen from Tables 9 and 10.  At the sample mean this implies an elasticity  of -1.48.  These
values are somewhat  lower (in absolute  value) than those found for central  budget
expenditures,  but remain substantial.
6.  Level of Development
The level of GDP per capita positively influences  per capita consolidated  budget
infrastructure  expenditures, as hypothesized. Unlike central budget expenditures,  evidence  of
any dampening  is weak at best, as can be seen from Tables 9 and 10 and Appendix C.  The
linear term is significant  at the one percent level in all regressions except some of those
where PCOM is replaced with a poverty incidence  estimate. It is likely that multicollinearity
reduces significance  levels in these cases.  The quadratic  term is seldom significant  even at
the 10 percent level; notable exceptions  include the runs measuring  the stock of infrastructure
as kilometers  of roads and rail relative to GDP per capita, and runs exploring  the alternative
sectoral balance  indicators.  The sign of the quadratic  term is, however, consistently
negative.- 46 -
The variation in the size of the estimated  coefficients  is small; a one $ increase in
GDP per capita increases consolidated  infrastructure  expenditures  by approximately  (1980)
US $ 0.03.  Given the limited evidence of any nonlinear effect, it makes sense to compute
the elasticity from the linear term alone.  If one does so, the estimated  elasticity is 1.83,
higher than that found in the case of central  budget expenditures. However, if one considers
that multicollinearity  may have reduced the estimated  significance  of the quadratic term, then
the estimated  elasticity is 1.42, just under that found for central  budget expenditures.
The findings  are quite comparable  when one measures  level of development  on the
basis of purchasing power parity dollars, as can be seen from Table C3 in Appendix C.  The
relationship  between GDPCAP2  and consolidated  budget per capita infrastructure
expenditures  is robustly positive and is consistently  significant  at the 1 percent level.  The
quadratic  term is generally, but not always, negative but never significant  even at the 15
percent level.  The coefficient  magnitudes  imply an elasticity at the sample mean of about
1.30, whether or not the elasticity calculation  takes account  of the quadratic term.  This
again is somewhat  lower than that found for central budget  infrastructure expenditures.
7.  Internal Balance
The results of the consolidated  budget per capita infrastructure expenditure  regressions
provide mixed results concerning  how governments  adjust infrastructure expenditures  in
response  to fiscal crises.  The estimated  coefficient  for BBGDPL is always negative  and is
generally  significant  at the 5 percent level or better, implying  that as the budget balance
deteriorates, consolidated  budget  per capita expenditures  on infrastructure  increase.  Across
sensitivity  analyses, the estimated  coefficients  range within fairly narrow bounds, generally
between -0.26 and -0.58.  This implies that when there is a budget deficit (BBGDPL<0), a
further deterioration  [improvement]  in the budget balance  leads to an increase [decrease]  in
consolidated  budget  per capita infrastructure  expenditures.  The estimated  elasticity at the
sample mean is 0.17 (calculated  from Table 9, M2), given the sample mean value for
BBGDPL  of -6.6.
Table C4 in Appendix  C shows the results of the sensitivity  analysis comparing
results for INFL4 with those for BBGDPL. The signs are inconsistent  with the results for
BBGDPL; INFL4 is negatively (but nonlinearly)  related to consolidated  budget infrastructure
expenditures. This implies that as the budget  balance deteriorates, inducing  inflation,
govemments  respond by scaling back infrastructure  expenditures  in apparent contradiction  to
the findings for BBGDPL. However, significance  levels are low.  The coefficients  are only
significant  at the 10 or 15 percent level.  The magnitude  of the estimated  coefficients  indicate
that consolidated  budget expenditures  on infrastructure  decrease as the inflation rate increases
until the inflation level reaches 241 percent, more than three standard deviations  above the
sample mean inflation value.  At the sample mean, the estimated  elasticity  is -0.12, the same
estimated  elasticity value found for central budget expenditures.- 47 -
The resolution of the apparently  contradictory  findings may lie in the question of
whether or not a given budget deficit is sustainable. Deficit spending  to finance productive
infrastructure expenditures  may be part of a strategy to speed up the rate of GDP growth.
Governments  may utilize this strategy so long as inflation remains in check.  However, once
prudent financing strategies are exhausted and inflation  begins to rise, deficit increasing
infrastructure  expenditures  may be scaled  back in an effort to stabilize the economy.
8.  External Balance
The regression runs using the trade balance  relative to GDP lagged one year
(TBWTGDPL)  provide no evidence  that the external balance  influences  consolidated  budget
infrastructure expenditures. While the estimated  sign of the coefficient  is generally  negative,
it is never significant  even at the 15 percent level, as can be seen from Tables 9 and 10 and
Appendix C.
One's conclusion  concerning  the importance  of the external balance for consolidated
infrastructure  expenditures  is sensitive  to how the external balance is measured, as can be
seen from Table C5 in Appendix  C.  When the external balance is assessed on the basis of
the black market foreign exchange  premium, BLACK, a robust negative and highly
significant  relationship  is found;  The greater is the black market foreign exchange  premium,
the lower are consolidated  budget per capita infrastructure expenditures. The value of the
coefficient  is about -.04, implying an elasticity  of -0.07, so the impact is not very
pronounced. This conclusion  is further substantiated  by the results of the regressions  using
DOLLAR4 as an index of external balance. Recall, that DOLLAR4 is actually an index of
trade orientation, with low values (below 100) corresponding  with inward orientation  and
high values (above 100) corresponding  with outward orientation.  One expects the external
balance will be worse the lower is the value of DOLLAR4. If a poor external balance
reduces infrastructure expenditures,  then the estimated  coefficient  for DOLLAR4 should be
positive.  This is exactly what is found.  The estimated  coefficient  for DOLLAR4 is positive
and significant  at the .05 level or better in all regressions.  When DOLLAR4  increases by I
unit (implying  a very substantial  movement  towards outward orientation since this variable
only ranges between 98 and 102), per capita consolidated  budget infrastructure  expenditures
increase by between (1980) US $3.00 and $3.50.  The corresponding  elasticity  estimate at
the sample mean is 16.81.
An overall conclusion  that the external balance  does influence  consolidated
infrastructure expenditures  appears warranted. Substantial  infrastructure expenditures  appear
to be required to remain competitive  internationally.
9.  Size of the Foreign Sector
There is considerable  evidence  that as the size of the foreign sector increases, per
capita consolidated  infrastructure expenditures  increase, as hypothesized. The finding is not
as robust, nor is the estimated  impact as great, as it was for central government- 48 -
infrastructure expenditures,  perhaps because  revenues from import and export earnings
accrue primarily to the central government. In the consolidated  budget  case, the estimated
coefficients  are generally  positive, but significance  levels vary,  typically  5 percent level or
better in models  MI and M2, the 10 percent level in models  M3 and M4, and worse than the
15 percent level in model  M5.  There is also variation in the estimated  impact and
significance  levels across sensitivity  analyses  as can be seen from Tables 9 and 10 and
Appendix  C.  The estimated  coefficient  is highly significant  in the runs measuring  level of
development  in purchasing  power parity dollars; the coefficients  are insignificant  in the runs
exploring alternative  indicators of sectoral  balance and some of the poverty indices.  The
estimated  coefficient  tends to fall between 5 and 29, with the higher value obtained for MI
and the lower value obtained  for M5.  However, the range estimate is higher in the runs with
INFL4, GDPCP2, DOLLAR4, the alternative  debt indicators and the alternative stock of
infrastructure  indicators.  Negative estimated  coefficient  values obtain for some of the runs
exploring alternative  indicators of sectoral  balance and replacing  PCOM with alternative
measures of the incidence  of poverty.
In the base runs (Tables 9 and 10) measuring  capital stocks as road and rail
kilometers relative to land area, and including the level (but not mix) of foreign savings
flows, the estimated  coefficient  is approximately  22, implying  an elasticity of 0.25.  This is
less than half the comparable  elasticity  estimate for central budget infrastructure
expenditures.
10.  Terms of Trade Shocks
Evidence  that terms of trade shocks  influence  consolidated  budget  per capita
infrastructure expenditures  is weak at best.  While the estimated  coefficient  is generally
negative, it is never significant  even at the 15 percent level. Whereas some sensitivity  of
central  budgetary expenditures  to terms of trade shocks  was found, consolidated  budgetary
infrastructure  expenditures  show no sensitivity. As in the case of TVALX2, this may simply
be a reflection of the fact that it is the central government,  as opposed to other levels of
government,  that receive taxes on export earnings.
11.  Debt Obligations
As was found in the case of central government  infrastructure  expenditures,  the
evidence that consolidated  budget per capita infrastructure  expenditures  are influenced  by
debt obligations  is weak at best.  The sign of the estimated  coefficient  is generally  negative
(whereas it was positive, but insignificant  in the central budget case), but significantly  so
only when HDRPOOR replaces  PCOM.  In all the base runs (Tables 9 and 10) and in all the
other sensitivity  analyses, the significance  level never reaches the 15 percent level.  This
finding is not sensitive  to how debt service obligations  are measured, as Table C6 Appendix
C shows.- 49 -
12.  Institutional  Development
As was the case for central government  infrastructure  expenditures,  consolidated
budget per capita infrastructure  expenditures  are influenced  by the level of institutional
development,  as can be seen from Tables 9 and 10. However, whereas GASTIL was strictly
negatively  related to central government  infrastructure  expenditures  (implying  infrastructure
expenditures  increased as the level of institutional  development  increased), the relationship  is
U shaped for consolidated  budget infrastructure  expenditures. This implies that as the level
of institutional  development  improves, consolidated  budget per capita infrastructure
expenditures  initially increase, but eventually  decrease.
The estimated  coefficients  for both the linear and quadratic  term are significant  at the
1 percent level in all base runs and virtually all sensitivity  analyses. There is some variation
in the range of the estimated  coefficients. Generally,  the estimated  coefficient  for the linear
term is between -15 and -11, while that for the quadratic term is between 1.1 and 1.7.  This
implies that the trough of the U occurs at a value just above or below the sample mean value
for GASTIL. In Table 9's base regression measuring the stock of infrastructure  as
FCINFPA, and including the level but not mix of foreign funding, the trough of the U occurs
when the value of GASTIL is 4.26.  The sample mean value for GASTIL is 4.34, so that for
this regression, at the sample mean, improvements  in institutional  development  tend to
reduce consolidated  budget outlays on infrastructure. The corresponding  elasticity estimate
is, not surprisingly, small, 0.05, since the trough is near the sample mean value for
GASTIL.  Consolidated  budget infrastructure  expenditures  would respond positively and
more strongly to improvements  in the level of institutional  development  in countries where
the level of institutional  development  is lower.
13.  Level and Mix of  External  Funding
Foreign savings flows positively influence  consolidated  budget per capita
infrastructure  expenditures  as they did central  government  expenditures. External funding
remains a significantly  positive determinant  of consolidated  budget per capita infrastructure
expenditures  regardless of whether or not  IMF credit is included  in the tally of foreign
savings flows, as can be seen from Table C7 in Appendix  C.  The estimated  coefficient  of
NFFCAPlK/NFFCAP2K  is always positive, and is generally  significant  at the 1 percent
level as can be seen from Tables 9 and 10 and Appendix C.  There are only a few
exceptions. The significance  level is lower when DOLLAR4 is used to assess the external
balance and when HDRPOOR replaces  PCOM.  The estimated  coefficient  is not significant
when the level of development  is assessed on the basis of purchasing  power parity dollars
(GDPCAP2).
The estimated coefficients  indicate that a (1980) US $ 1.00 increase in per capita
foreign flows increase consolidated  budget  per capita infrastructure expenditures  by about
(1980) US $ 0.03.  The implied  elasticity at the sample mean is 0.09, somewhat  larger than
was found for central budget  expenditures. The estimated magnitude  of the impact is
surprisingly stable across all sensitivity  analyses.- 50  -
The mix of foreign funding  influences  consolidated  budget infrastructure expenditures.
The nature of the influence  is similar, but not identical to that found in the case of central
buidget  infrastructure  expenditures. Holding the level of funding  constant, countries with a
high proportion of official flows spend neither more nor less than those with a low
proportion of official flows.  This finding  holds regardless of whether IMF flows are
included  or excluded  from the official flow tally, as can be seen from Table C7.  However,
as the proportion of commercial  bank flows increases, per capita consolidated  budget
infrastructure expenditures  increase  at an increasing  rate.  At sample means, the estimated
elasticity is 0.48, much greater than was found for central budget infrastructure expenditures.
As was found for central budget infrastructure  expenditures,  as the share of direct foreign
investment  increases (holding  the total level of foreign flows constant), consolidated  budget
infrastructure  expenditures  initially  fall, but subsequently  rise.  The estimated  elasticity  at the
sample mean is -0.08.  The trough of the relationship  occurs when the level of direct foreign
investment  reaches about 1.5 percent of GDP, somewhat  less than one standard  deviation
above the sample mean. Direct foreign investment  only induces increased consolidated  per
capita infrastructure expenditures  in countries where the level of foreign investment  is
exceptionally  high.  These findings are robust across base runs and sensitivity  analyses.
14.  Government  Objectives -- Poverty Commitment
Consolidated  per capita infrastructure  expenditures  do not respond to the level of
poverty alleviation  commitment  as assessed by PCOM.  This finding  is robust across all base
nins and sensitivity  analyses. The estimated sign of PCOM is inconsistent  across runs, and
the coefficient  is never significant  even at the 15 percent level, as can be seen from
Appendix  C.  Indicators of poverty levels, as opposed to our indicator of poverty
commitment,  do no better.  The signs are inconsistent  across runs and the coefficients  are
actver  significant  as can be seen from Tables C8.
The findings of regressions including  poverty incidence  indicators, as opposed to our
poverty commitment  indicator, are consistent  with those found for the central budget
regressions.  However, poverty alleviation  commitment,  PCOM, was found to significantly
influence  central government  per capita infrastructure  expenditures,  while PCOM does not
influience  consolidated  budget expenditures. It may  be that at lower levels of government,
investments  in infrastructure  are not viewed  as an effective  means to alleviate  poverty.
Hlowever,  it may also be that there is a relationship,  but because our review of documents
only focused  on the central government,  the variable PCOM is a poor indicator of the extent
of commitment  to poverty alleviation  at lower levels of government. This issue warrants
further exploration.- 51  -
15.  Consolidated  Budget Per Capita  Infrastructure Expenditures: Summary and
Conclusions
Table 11 summarizes  the overall results of the analysis for consolidated  per capita
infrastructure  expenditures. The table shows the hypothesized  relationship  between the
different variables and per capita consolidated  budget  expenditures, and the direction of the
estimated  relationship. The instantaneous  rate of change in infrastructure expenditures  and
the elasticity  are shown as computed for the sample mean values of the independent
variables. In the case of nonlinear relationships,  the estimated  peak or trough is indicated.
The values without parentheses  are those corresponding  to Table 9's FCINFPA base
regression including foreign funding, M2, and, except where relevant, excluding the mix of
foreign funding.  The values in parentheses  are those corresponding  to the comparable
regression  including the dummy  variables for year (Table 10).
Among all the factors hypothesized  to influence  consolidated  budget expenditures  on
infrastructure, four are found to have no impact.  Two factors, terms of trade shocks  and
debt service obligations, were hypothesized  to have a positive and negative  influence,
respectively, on consolidated  budget infrastructure  expenditures. No significant  relationship
is found for either of these variables.  Part of the explanation  may lie in the central
government's claim on export tax revenues and responsibility  for debt service payments.
These factors are not likely to play as prominently  in financing  capabilities,  obligations  and,
accordingly,  decisions  at lower levels of govemment. We would, however, have expected  an
influence  through changes in central govemment  transfers to lower levels and due to the fact
that the central budget is one component  of the consolidated  budget.
No a priori hypothesis  could be made conceming the impact of government  objectives
or official foreign savings on infrastructure  expenditures. Govemment  commitment  to
poverty alleviation, as assessed by PCOM, had no influence  on consolidated  infrastructure
expenditures. This could reflect different and offsetting strategies for poverty alleviation
between the central govemment  and lower levels of govemment. It could also be that the
extent of commitment  to poverty alleviation  differs by level of government,  and that while
PCOM reasonably  reflects the central govemment's commitment,  it only poorly reflects the
overall commitment  to poverty alleviation. Holding the level of foreign savings flows
constant, infrastructure expenditures  are not sensitive  to whether a large or small share of
foreign savings flows arise from official transfers.  Holding the level of foreign savings flows
constant, countries with a high level of official flows allocate  about the same amount to
infrastructure expenditures  as those receiving  a low level of official flows.
Five factors, the stock of infrastructure, the level of development,  the size of the
foreign sector, the level of foreign savings flows, and the share of commercial  bank flows in
total savings flows, are found to positively influence  consolidated  budget per capita
infrastructure expenditures. For the first four factors, the impact is linear, while for
commercial  bank flows, the rate of impact increases.- 52 -
For the stock of infrastructure, offsetting forces were hypothesized. The results from
the consolidated  budget expenditure  regressions  indicate that diminishing  returns are offset by
the expenditure  required to offset depreciation  of the existing stock of infrastructure or cross
country differences  in the degree of complementarity  between infrastructure and the existing
productive structure of the economy. The result is not, however, robust across all definitions
of the stock of infrastructure. In particular, no significant  relationship  is found when the
stock is measured  as the road and rail kilometers  relative to the GDP, or more broadly as the
total capital stock (private plus public) of the country.
The level of development  was hypothesized  to positively,  but possibly nonlinearly,
influence  the level of infrastructure expenditures,  since government services and goods are
expected to be normal goods, and structural changes accompanying  development  are expected
to increase the return to infrastructure  investments. The linear and positive relationship
found for consolidated  budget per capita infrastructure expenditures  is robust and is not
sensitive  to how the level of development  is measured.
The size of the foreign sector was also hypothesized  to be positively related to the
expenditures  on infrastructure given the link between the size of the foreign sector and
taxable capacity. Support for this hypothesis  is robust.  Similarly, the level of foreign
savings flows was hypothesized  to be positively related to government  expenditures  on
infrastructure since these flows can either directly be used for infrastructure expenditures  or
reduce budgetary outlays for other items, freeing up funds for infrastructure investment.
This hypothesis  receives robust confirmation  from the consolidated  budget infrastructure
expenditure  regressions.
We speculated  that, holding the total level of foreign savings flows constant, countries
receiving  a higher proportion of foreign funding  in the form of commercial  bank flows might
allocate a different amount for infrastructure expenditures,  although no a prior hypothesis
was made concerning  the direction of the impact.  The results here robustly indicate that
countries  receiving a high proportion of foreign flows in the form of commercial  bank loans
spend more on infrastructure out of the consolidated  budget.  In fact, the estimated
relationship  indicates infrastructure expenditures  increase at an increasing  rate as the share of
commercial  bank loans in foreign savings flows increases.
In addition  to the five factors mentioned  above, there is qualified evidence that
countries with a better external balance spend more out of the consolidated  budget on
infrastructure. While the trade balance relative to the GDP did not have a measurable  impact
on consolidated  budget expenditures,  the evidence  indicates that countries with a lower black
market exchange  rate premium or that are more outward oriented do have higher
consolidated  budget  per capita infrastructure expenditures. This finding implies that the
focus of stabilization  and structural adjustment  programs on improving the external balance
in and of itself tends to increase  per capita consolidated  infrastructure  expenditures.
However, to the extent that these programs succeed in improving the internal balance or
inadvertently  reduce GDP growth, this positive impact may be offset.- 53 -
Four factors, population  density, urbanization,  the labor force participation  rate and
the intenal balance are found to negatively  influence  consolidated  budget infrastructure
expenditures. Low population  densities  necessitate  higher expenditures  for a given level of
infrastructure service and it is this force that drives the relationship. Countries with a higher
proportion of the population  in urban areas are found to have lower consolidated  per capita
infrastructure expenditures,  also reflecting economies  of scale. The negative relationship
found between the labor force participation  rate and consolidated  budget infrastructure
expenditures  implies that labor and infrastructure  are net substitutes  in production. Given the
likely correlation between labor force participation  rates and the population  growth rate, this
relationship  may also imply that, cetenis  panbus, when population  growth rates are higher,
infrastructure expenditures  increase.
The findings for the internal balance imply that when the budget balance deteriorates,
per capita consolidated  infrastructure expenditures  increase.  This may reflect a conscious
policy to foster development  by putting in place productive infrastructure  to crowd in private
investment. However, the results from the sensitivity  analysis suggest this policy is only
pursued so long as the deficit is sustainable  and inflationary  forces do not take hold.
Nonlinear effects on consolidated  infrastructure  expenditure  are found for the rural-
urban balance, institutional  development  and direct foreign  investment. Holding the level of
foreign savings flows constant, low levels of direct foreign  investment tend to reduce
consolidated  budget outlays for infrastructure, while very high levels increase them.  This is
contrary to expectations; a strict positive relationship  was hypothesized. As the sectoral
balance  deteriorates, consolidated  infrastructure  expenditures  initially  increase.  Urban-rural
migration  places increasing  pressure on governments  to expand  urban infrastructure; one
means to stem migration  is to increase  infrastructure and service provision in the rural areas.
Although the estimated  relationship  implies that infrastructure  expenditures  increase at a
decreasing rate, the estimated  peak expenditure  level occurs at a very high level, implying
the relationship  is positive, as hypothesized,  for most countries.
The relationship  between GASTIL and consolidated  budget  infrastructure expenditures
is U shaped, implying that as the level of institutional  development  improves, consolidated
budget per capita infrastructure  expenditures  initially increase, but eventually  decrease.  The
trough of the relationship  occurs when GASTIL reaches a value just below the population
mean value.  Thus improvements  in institutional  development  will increase  consolidated
budget per capita infrastructure expenditures  in about half of the sample countries and
decrease them in the other half.  The nonlinear  relationship  found may reflect the
juxtaposition  of the two forces linking institutional  development  with infrastructure
expenditures  noted earlier on.  When institutions  begin to develop, and the market begins to
flourish, private sector demand for productive  public infrastructure may increase.  However,
once institutional  development  reaches a high enough level, the growing ability of the private
sector to take over the supply of some forms of infrastructure  provision may dominate.- 54 -
Table 11.  Consolidated Budget Infrastrcture  Expenditures: Summary of Results
Hypo4beaized  Estimated  Effect  Peak or  Ehaticity
Variable  Relationship  Relationship  Effect I unit Inrea  Trough  at Men
Stock of lnfr_tuure
FCRNFPA  ?  >0  $0.02  - 0.25
(S 0.02)  0.25)
Population  Denity
DENS  t  <0  S-0.06  - -0.34
(S-0.06)  (-0.33)
Udranization
URBAN4  <0  <0  $-0.5  -1.1
(S-0.55)  (-1.15)
Sectoral  Imbalance
MIGZ  & MIGZSQ  >0  Inverted  U  $4.45  5.52  0.37
($4.30)  (5.51)  (0.38)
Labor Force Participation
LFPER  ?  <0  S-0.79  - -1.48
($-0.79)  (-1.47)
Level of Development
GDPCAPK  >0 /Inverted U  >0  $0.03  - 1.83
($0.03)  (1.S)
Internl Balance
BBGDPL  ?  <0  S-0.04  - 0.01
(-0.08)  (0.01)
INFL4 & INFL4SQ  ?  U Shaped  S-0.12  241  -0.12
External  Balance
TBWIGDPL  ?  N.S.  - - -
BLACK  ?  <0  S-0.04  - -0.07
DOLLAR4  ?  >0  S 3.29  - 16.81
Size Poreign  Sector
TVALX2  >0  >0  S 21.68  - 0.25
(5 22.24)  (0.25)
Termc  of Trade Shock
TOTS  >0  N.S.  - - -
Debt Obligations
DSGDP  <0  N.S.  - - -
Insitutional  Development
GASTIL  ?  U Shaped  $ 0.22  4.26  0.05
(5 0.30)  (4.23)  (0.07)
Level Foreign  Funding
NFFCAPIK  >0  >0  $ 0.03  - 0.09
(S 0.03)  (0.10)
Mix of Foreign  Funding
NOFGDPI  N.S.  -
NCBGDPSQ  ?  U Shaped  S  0.79  - 0.48
($ 0.76)  (0.47)
DFIGDP  & DFIGDPSQ  >0  U Shaped  S-2.25  51.47  -0.08
(S-2.22)  ($1.41)  (4-08)
Poverty  Comnitment
PCOM  ?  N.S.  - - -- 55 -
The elasticity estimates  presented in Table 11 show how responsive  consolidated
budget per capita infrastructure expenditures  are to each of the factors.  The urbanization
rate, labor force participation  rate and level of development  are the most important
determinants  of consolidated  budget infrastructure  expenditures. All have elasticities  greater
than 1 in absolute  value at the sample mean. Population  density, the sectoral  balance, and
commercial  bank flows also have a substantial  impact  on consolidated  budget per capita
infrastructure expenditures  with elasticities  greater than 0.3, but less than 1.0 in absolute
value, at the sample mean.  The stock of infrastructure, the internal balance, and the size of
the foreign sector only have a modest  impact on consolidated  budget infrastructures, with
elasticities  ranging between 0.1 and 0.3 in absolute value.  Institutional  development,  the
level of foreign savings flows, and the share of foreign investment  in foreign savings flows
only have a tiny impact on consolidated  budget  per capita infrastructure  expenditures. The
estimated  elasticities  are below 0.1 in absolute value at the sample mean.  The relative
importance  of the different factors, especially  those factors with nonlinear relationships,  will
differ for countries where the value of the factors concerned  deviate substantially  from the
sample mean.
D.  A Comparison of Analyses of Per Capita  Infrastructure  Expenditure  Using Central
Budget vs. Consolidated Budget Data
Most of findings regarding the determinants  of public infrastructure expenditures  are
broadly consistent  regardless of whether central budget or consolidated  budget expenditures
are the focus of concern.  The most important determinants  of infrastructure expenditures  are
the level of development,  the urbanization  rate and the labor force participation  rate.  The
size of the foreign sector, sectoral  balance, and the stock of infrastructure  are also important
determinants  of per capita infrastructure  expenditures. The level and mix of foreign funding
play a lesser role, but influence  central and consolidated  budget  per capita infrastructure
expenditures  in a similar fashion. There is only weak  evidence that terms of trade shocks
and debt service obligations  significantly  influence  either central or consolidated  budget
expenditures,  although the evidence is stronger for central government  expenditures.
Despite these similarities, several factors appear to influence  central and consolidated
per capita infrastructure expenditures  differently. Population  density and institutional
development,  are important  determinants  of both central and consolidated  budget
expenditures,  but the nature of the relationship  differs. The internal balance and external
balance appear to be more important  determinants  of consolidated  than central government
infrastructure  expenditures.  Finally, the central government's commitment  to poverty
alleviation  influences  central government  expenditures  on infrastructure, while it appears to
have no influence  on consolidated  budget expenditures.
Infrastructure  expenditures  increase with the level of development. For central
budget, but not consolidated  budget expenditures,  they are found to increase at a decreasing
rate when the level of development  is assessed on the basis of GDP per capita in constant- 56 -
1980 US dollars.  If the level of development  is assessed on the basis of GDP per capita in
1985  purchasing power parity dollars, the effect is found to be strictly linear in both the
central and consolidated  budget case.  The magnitude  of the impact is substantial. Elasticity
estimates  at the sample mean are 1.69 and 1.83 for the central and consolidated  budget
estimates, respectively, when level of development  is measured  in constant dollars.  When
the level of development  is measured  on the basis of purchasing  power parities, the
respective elasticities  are 1.57 and 1.30.
Higher urbanization  and labor force participation  rates are associated  with lower per
capita infrastructure expenditures. Of the two factors, the labor force participation  rate has a
stronger impact on infrastructure expenditures. For the labor force participation  rate, the
estimated  elasticities  at the sample mean are -2.73 and -1.48 for the central and consolidated
budgets, respectively; the elasticity estimates  for the urbanization  rate are -1.10 and -1.15
for the central and consolidated  budgets, respectively.
Per capita infrastructure expenditures  are greater in countries with a large foreign
sector.  The size of the foreign sector is a more important determinant  of central govemment
expenditures  than consolidated  budget expenditures. This probably reflects the fact that
export and import taxes tend to accrue to the central govemment.  The estimated  elasticities
at the sample mean are 0.60 for central budget  expenditures  and 0.25 for consolidated  budget
expenditures.
A sectoral imbalance  between rural and urban areas positively  influences  per capita
infrastructure expenditures. The relationship  is strictly linear in the case of central budget
expenditures; consolidated  budget expenditures  on infrastructure  increase at a decreasing  rate
as the imbalance  grows.  The magnitude  of the estimated  elasticities  at the sample mean are
comparable  for both central and consolidated  budget expenditures,  0.41 and 0.37,
respectively.
As the stock of infrastructure  increases, so do per capita infrastructure expenditures.
The elasticity  estimates are fully comparable  between samples.  For the central budget, the
estimated  elasticity at the sample mean is 0.23, while it is 0.25 for the consolidated  budget.
The level of foreign savings flows is positively related to per capita infrastructure
expenditures. Foreign savings flows in general are not particularly important  determinants  of
per capita infrastructure  expenditures. The elasticity  estimates  at the sample mean are only
0.06 and 0.09 for the central and consolidated  budgets, respectively. There is an important
qualification;  the composition  of foreign savings matters. When commercial  bank flows are
a high proportion of foreign savings, infrastructure expenditures  are larger.  Holding the
level of foreign savings constant, the estimated  elasticity  with respect to commercial  bank
flows is 0.06 for the central  budget and a much greater 0.47 for the consolidated  budget.  As
the share of direct foreign investment  in total foreign savings increases, infrastructure
expenditures  initially decrease, but eventually  increase. The elasticity estimates  at the sample- 57 -
mean (holding  the level of foreign savings constant)  are -0.06 and -0.08 for central and
consolidated  budget expenditures, respectively.
There is no evidence that terms of trade shocks  significantly  influence  consolidated
budget per capita infrastructure  expenditures. The evidence of an impact on central budget
expenditures  is weak; the significance  level of the estimated  coefficients  is generally  between
10 and 15 percent.  In any case, at the sample mean the impact  is tiny;  the elasticity
estimate is only 0.01.  Similarly  the evidence  that debt obligations  influence  central budget
infrastructure  expenditures  is weak;  there is no evidence  that they influence  consolidated
budget  infrastructure expenditures. In the central  budget regressions, the estimated
coefficient  for the debt services obligation  relative to GDP is positive, contrary to
expectations,  but the significance  levels are low, generally  in the 10 to 15 percent range.
Significance  levels do not even reach 15 percent when the alternative  indicators of debt
obligations  are used.
While higher population  densities  are strictly negatively  related to consolidated  budget
infrastructure expenditures, central  government  expenditures  initially  increase, but
subsequently  decrease as population  densities  rise.  The peak of the relation occurs at about
one and a half times the sample mean population  density value, so that the estimated
elasticity  of central government  infrastructure expenditures  is positive, 0.24, at the sample
mean.  For consolidated  budget expenditures,  the comparable  elasticity estimate is -0.33.
The opposite pattern is found for institutional  development. For the central budget,
as GASTIL rises (indicating  a lower level of institutional  development),  per capita
infrastructure expenditures  decrease throughout. However,  consolidated  budget expenditures
initially decrease as GASTIL rises, but begin increasing  before GASTIL reaches the sample
mean value.  At the population  mean, the elasticity estimate is accordingly  negative and
fairly large, -0.60,  for central budget  per capita infrastructure expenditures,  but positive and
quite modest, 0.05, for consolidated  budget expenditures.
The budget deficit influences  consolidated  budget per capita infrastructure
expenditures; as the budget deficit increases, per capita infrastructure expenditures  increase.
The elasticity estimate is 0.17 at the sample mean. However, the budget deficit  per se has
no significant  impact on central government  infrastructure  expenditures. There is evidence
that the sustainability  of the deficit matters.  As the rate of inflation increases, both central
and consolidated  budget infrastructure  expenditures  decrease, although  at a decreasing rate.
The elasticity  estimates  at the sample mean are both -0.12.
Evidence  that the external balance  influences  per capita infrastructure expenditures  is
stronger for the consolidated  than central government  budget. Improvements  in the trade
balance  are associated  with greater central budget infrastructure expenditures,  but
significance  levels are extremely  low.  There is no evidence  that consolidated  budget
infrastructure expenditures  move with the trade balance.  However, outward orientation is
strongly and positively associated  with increased  consolidated  budget infrastructure- 58 -
expenditures. The elasticity estimate at the mean is 16.81.  No significant  relationship  is
found between trade orientation and central government  infrastructure  expenditures. As the
black market foreign exchange  premium increases, both central and consolidated  budget
infrastructure expenditures  decrease.  The significance  levels of the estimated  coefficients
are, however, much greater in the consolidated  budget case.
The central government's commitment  to poverty influences  central government
expenditures  on infrastructure. The relationship  has an inverted U shape, so that near the
sample mean value for PCOM, expenditures  are highest.  Governments  that are not
committed  to poverty alleviation  or have an extremely  strong commitment  to poverty
alleviation  spend less out of the central budget on infrastructure. No relationship  between
PCOM and consolidated  budget expenditures  on infrastructure was found.- 59 -
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ENDNOTES
1.  This  report  is  part  of  a  larger  study of  the  factors that influence broad  public
expenditure  categories: infrastructure, human capital (specifically  education  and health), and
public consumption goods.  Consequently, our  dependent variable combines government
spending on both transportation and communication.  Further disaggregation of these and
other forms of expenditure  on infrastructure would  be a useful extension  of this research.
2.  Consolidated  expenditures  are conceptually  a better measure of a country's outlay on
infrastructure, but unitary countries often report only central government  expenditures, even
if there exist some forms of local spending on infrastructure.  Because there are no more
observations available for central budget regressions and because there is probably greater
consistency  between counties in the reporting of central government expenditures  than in the
reporting of consolidated  government expenditures  we first report and discuss the results of
the central budget regressions, followed  by the results of the consolidated  budget regressions.
Sensitivity analyses for both sets of regressions are reported, and any significant  differences
in results are noted.
3.  International  Monetary  Fund,  Government Finance  Statistics  Yearbook  (RMF,
Washington,  D.C. various years).
4.  Given the  nature of  the  dependent variable (per  capita government expenditures on
transportation and communications),  the existing stock variable ideally should at least be
expanded to include measures of communication  as well as transportation stocks.  The 1994
World Development  Report contains data on telephone  mainlines  per 1000 persons, however,
these data are available only for a single year (1990) and are incompatible  with the present
study  period  (1980-86).  Data  availability also  limited  the  use  of  quality-adjusted
infrastructure stock variables, but  it  appears that  quality-adjusted stocks may be  highly
correlated with unadjusted  stock variables, at least in the case of paved road mileage. Using
data from Table 32 of WDR94, for low and middle-income  countries that report both paved
road  density (km  per  million) and percent of  paved roads  in  good condition, one  can
construct  a  quality-adjusted stock variable  (kan of  good  paved  roads  per  million) by
multiplying  these two variables.  The correlation between this quality-adjusted  stock variable
and the unadjusted stock  variable (paved road density) is 0.925.
5.  In the conceptual model, although  household  labor supply is fixed in physical units, it
is variable in  terms of effective (or efficiency) units.  (The household's effective labor
supply is enhanced by public expenditures  on human resource development,  e.g.,  education
and health, as well as private consumption  of productivity-enhancing  goods such as food ).
The  wage  per  efficiency  unit  is  determined  by  competitive forces  in  the  model;
unemployment  is assumed to equal zero in equilibrium.  The fact that labor markets do not
necessarily (or even typically) clear in  developing countries suggests that the question of- 63 -
whether labor and public infrastructure  are complements  or substitutes could alternatively  be
explored from the demand side utilizing, for example, the ratio of the employed population
to  the  total  population.  Both data  availability and  a  desire  to  be  consistent with our
theoretical model dictated our choice of the labor force participation rate instead.  In later
work we intended to explore the alternative specification.
6.  David Dollar, "Outward Orientation and Growth:  an Empirical Study Using a Price-
Based Measure of Openness", mimeo.  This paper was a background  paper for the World
Development  Report 1991.  The actual data series used was included  in WDR91SD.
7.  Both indices,  GAS_POL and  GAS_CIV were  compiled by  Raymond Gastil  in
Freedom  in the World (Westport: Greenwood  Press, various years).
8.  We would like to thank Stephen Onyiwu  for undertaking  the review of documents that
served as the basis for the poverty commitment  ranking.
9.  Table 17 in United Nations Development  Program,  Human Development  Report 1992
(New York:  Oxford University  Press, 1992).
10.  The full regression results can be obtained  from the authors upon request.
11.  To some extent, the relatively high R2s may be attributable to data pooling.  This
pooling of data over the period 1980-1986 increased our degrees of freedom, which were
constrained by missing observations  in right hand side variables for low and middle-income
countries.  For some variables (e.g., the Canning and Fay data on road mileage), five year
point interval data were interpolated, giving us more degrees of freedom than "warranted."
On the other hand, not all right hand side variables have limited variation;  some have fairly
substantial  recorded variation, even within the limited time period.  It seems inappropriate to
discard this information by using longer time-period averages.  Moreover, the adaption of
common time-period averages further reduces sample size.  Finally, the cyclical variation
that  would be  reduced or  eliminated by  time-period averaging is  not  irrelevant to  the
questions of interest.  For  example, if a country runs a deficit (budget or  trade), which
cannot be indefinitely sustained, we would like to know if infrastructure expenditure  suffers
as a result.  We plan to further explore the influence of cross-sectional versus time-series
variation in explanatory  variables within a fixed-effects  version of the model.
12.  As in  any regression analysis, causality running from independent variables to the
dependent  variable cannot be assured.  An alternative interpretation of the present result is
that counties which spend more per capita on infrastructure are better able to attract external
funding.  Our model treats external funding as  an exogenous factor, but  an interesting
extension of  this line of  research would be the specification  of a  "funding formula" that
would allow countries to consider the effects of their behavior on external support.
13.  The full regression results are available  from the authors upon request.A-1
APPFNDIX A: THE MODEL
While this is primarily an empirical study of the  determinants of  public spending on
infrastructure,  the structure  of the estimated  equations  is motivated  by an underlying model  of a
dual economy. The analytical  framework  is a four-sector  general equilibrium  model, consisting  of
urban  households,  urban producers,  rural households,  and a single  govemment. Total population
of the economy  (N) is fixed, but households  may migrate  between the rural and urban  sectors  in
response  to perceived  differences  in utility levels. Since the purpose of this model is to focus on
investments  in urban  infrastructure,  vis-a-vis  other forms of public  expenditure,  the urban  sector is
more completely  specified  than  the rural sector. This specification  includes the role of urban  land
(or space),  not only as a source  of utility for households  and a factor of production  for firms,  but
also as a potential  source  of property  tax revenue  for public services.t
Urban  households  consume a  domestic composite good,  residential space, and  a
consumption-oriented  public good, 2 and provide labor for  domestic urban production.  Each
urban household  supplies  an amount of labor that is fixed in physical units (e.g., person-years),
but variable in terms of effective  (or efficiency)  units of labor.  In particular, the household's
effective  labor supply  per unit of time is enhanced  by public expenditures  on human resource
development such as education,  personal  health care and public health facilities,  as well as by its
private consumption  of the domestic  composite  good and residential  space. The labor-enhancing
effect  of human  resource  outlays  (hereafter,  simply  "training"  or T) is consistent  with the theory  of
The property tax generally has played a minor role in LDCs,  but the financial strains of  stnrctural adjustment,
problems of urban congestion, and the escalation  of urban land values have stimulated interest in property or
development  taxes as a means of funding public services in many LDCs.  This was an important issue at the
Lincoln  Institute's  Cambridge  Conference  Ir (September  1991).
2  Households  benefit from G. but cannot select  an individual  level of consumption. Expenditures  on the pure
public good are set by govemment  and, hence, regarded  as parametric  by  the household.  In the full general
equilibrium model, however,  this level of consumption-type  public goods, as well as the levels of other public
expenditures  on 'training' and 'infrastructure'  are endogenously  determnined.  In the described  torm of the model,  all
public  goods are funded  by revenues  generated  by a mix  of taxes.A-2
public investment in  human capital. 3 The labor-enhancing  effect of  private noneducational
consumption  reflects more recent work on household  productivity and the influence  of better
nutrition  on health  status  and labor efficiency. 4 The influence  of residential  space on household
productivity,  due to alleviation  of overcrowding,  has received  less  attention,  but we allow for such
effects in the modeL The wage rate per effective  labor unit (or efficiency  wage) is market-
determined  but parametric  to the household. Yet each household's  income is endogenous  due to
the variability  in its effective  supply of labor. 5 Utility maximizing  decisions  of the representative
urban  household  result  in demands  for the domestic  composite  good and residential  space, and an
effective labor supply.  Each of these behavioral functions, and the resulting indirect utility
function,  depends  on: the market-determined  efficiency  wage,  the price of the composite  good, and
the price of residential  space;  parameters  of the utility  function  and the labor-enhancement  function;
and certain  government  choice  variables  including  public  expenditures  on "training' and personal
tax rates on wages, domestic consumption,  and residential space (property).  Although these
wages, prices and fiscal policies  are parametric  to the individual  household,  each value will be
endogenously  determined  within  the complete  general  equilibrium  model.
The urban  household's  problem is to:
Maximize U(x,sr; G) + p{(1-tw)wXh[x,sr; (T+I)]  - (l+tx)pxx  - (l+ts)psrsr},  (1)
(x,Sr,p)
where  choice  variables  x and sr are the household's  consumption  of the domestic  composite  good
and residential  space,  respectively,  and p is the Lagrange  multiplier. Both goods provide utility
(U), but they  also  contribute  to the household's  effective  supply of labor (1),  given by the product
of the (fixed)  physical  units  of labor supplied  (X)  times  the labor enhancement  function,
3  See, for example,  T.W. Schultz (1975), Jarnison  and Lau (1982), Psacharopoulos  (1985), and T.P. Schultz
(1988).
4  Contributions  to this literature  include:  Bliss and Stem (1978), Strauss (1985, 1986), Behrman  and Deolalikar
(1988),  and Deolalikar  (1988).
S  The efficiency  wage hypothesis,  discussed  by  Liebenstein  (1957),  Mazumdar(1959),  Stiglitz  (1976) and others,
has been used often  in specific  applications  in labor  economics,  economic  development  and macroeconomics.A-3
h[x,sr; (T+I)].  Just as consumption-type  public goods (G) enhance household  utility, human
resource public goods, or "training," enhance the effective supply  of labor, each unit of which
earns  a market  wage  of w.  Unlike  G, training  is cumulative  and thus the current  effective  supply
of labor by the representative  household  depends  on both current  human  capital expenditures  (T)
and the existing  stock  of human  capital  ()  . The household  does not individually  choose G or T,
but the levels  of these  public  expenditures  influence  household  decisions.  Other  public  instruments
that  condition  household  choices  are the tax rates on wages  (tw), purchases  of the domestic  good
(tx), and consumption  of residential  space (ts).  Household  choices are also affected by market-
determined  prices  of the domestic  composite  good (Px)  and residential  space  (psr).
Simple  Cobb-Douglas  forms for the utility  function  and the labor  enhancement  function,  or
U(x,sr; G) = AxasrbGc,  A > 0,  a,b,c E (0,1),  (a+b+c)  < 1  (2)
and
h[x,sr; (T+2)]  = BXasr(T+)Y,  B> 0,  a,3,y  e  (0,1),  (a+P) < 1,  (3)
yield  demand  functions  of the form:
-^* = IZ IZ2(  1-0)Z3  P(T+I)yI  1/(1  -a-D)  (4)
sr  = [ZIZ2 XZ3Z(I  -a)(T+IDYI  l/(1-a-0)  (5)
Using these  expressions  in the labor enhancement  function  also gives  the household's  effective
supply  of labor:
I* = Xh* =  [Zi(a+o)Z 2 aZ3P(T+I)Y] l/(1-a-)  (6)
where,  in each  of the above  behavioral  functions:
Z, =  [(l-tw)wXBY(a+b); Z2= [a(l-p)+ba]/[(l+tx)pxl;  and  Z3 = [aP+b(I-a)]I(l+ts)psrI.
Note that "training"  (1J provided by the public sector not only has a positive effect on the
supply  of effective  labor fd(]*/IT > 0 in (6)1,  but through  the enhancement  of earnings  it alsoA-4
affects the household's  consumption  of domestic goods (x*) and residential  space (sr*).  The
consumption  public  good (G) does not directly  alter the demand  or effective  labor  supply  behavior,
but does  affect  the equilibrium  level of utility  of the urban household,  given  by the indirect utility
function:
U* =A[ Z a+b Z2a(l-0)  +bc z  ao+b(  1-a) (T+I)Y(a+b)  I 1 /(l-a-P) Gc.  (7)
Since this level of utility is compared  to the (exogenous)  level of utility for rural households
[U(Yr,Ar), where Yr  is rural  income  per household  and Ar is the level of rural  public assistance],
the government's  provision  of both T and G may influence  the distribution  of population  between
sectors.  These behavioral functions for urban households (4-7), along with the behavioral
functions of  other key sectors, are  ultimately used to  construct the conditions for general
equilibrium  in the  economy.
Urban  firms combine units of effective  labor, nonresidential  space, and private capital to
produce the domestic  composite  good, however,  production  is enhanced  by public  expenditures  on
infrastructure. Competitive  profit-maximization,  under conditions  of diminishing  returns to scale
in private inputs,  yields  demands  for private  inputs, output supply,  and the indirect  profit function.
Each behavioral  function  depends  on: market-determined  values  of the  product  price, the efficiency
wage, the price  of nonresidential  space,  and  the rental  price of capital;  parameters  of the production
function; and government  choices of  a  property  tax rate  and  a  level of  expenditures on
infrastructure. Other  government  instruments  (tw,tx,  G, T), which were applied to households,
indirectly  affect  the representative  firm's behavior through their influence  on market wages and
prices.
The urban firm's  problem  is to:
Maximize rI(l,sn,k;  I) = Pxx[l,sn,k; (1+1)]  - wl - (1+ts)Psnsn - rk,  (8)
(1,sn,k)A-5
where  choice variables  1,  sn, and k are the firm's  inputs of effective  units of labor, nonresidential
space, and private capital,  respectively. Output  of the domestic  composite  good (x) depends  not
only on these three private inputs, but also the  sum of current period public spending on
infrastructure  (I) and the existing  stock of infrastructure  (I).  The firm cannot individually  select
the level of infrastructure,  but its output (x) is augmented  by this public good, as indicated  by the
production function,  x[l,sn,k; (I+!)]. Wage and sales taxes, which  were levied directly  on house-
holds, do not enter the fu-m's  profit function,  but will influence  the market  price of the domestic
good (px) and the market wage (w) in the full general equilibrium  model.  Private capital is
elastically  supplied  to the firm  at a fixed  rental rate (r).  Besides  infrastructure  (I), the other public
policy instrument  that directly  influences  production  decisions  is the rate of property taxation  (ts)
on nonresidential  space.
A Cobb-Douglas  production  function  with diminishing  returns  to private  inputs,  or
X[l,Sn,k;  (I+DI  = Cl6snE(I+DP,  C >  0,  O,I,  £ (0,1),  (6+E+d)  <  1,  (9)
yields  input demand  functions  of the form:
1*  = [PxC(I+Df Z4l&4  Z5E Z64 ]  14  14-s4)  (10)
Sn=  [ PXC(I+  Z4  6 Z5-&4  ZA Il/(-&-4  (11)
k' = [pxC(I+)  Z4° Z5E  Z6
1-6-£ I 1/( -5-4)  (12)
where, in each of the above  behavioral  functions,
Z4= (6/w);  Z5 =  [/(l+ts)psn];  and  Z6  =(Vr);
Substitution  of (10-12) into the production  function and the profit function give the  firm's
supply  function  and  indirect  (maximum)  profit  function:
X  [PX  £  C(I+PZ 4 5rZ'  Z6 14]l 4 1-C)  (13)
II* = (1-&-&4)[  Px C(I+D  Z40 Z5£ Z6 I 14  6E-.  (14)A-6
These behavioral  functions  for urban  firms (10-14)  enter into the general  equilibrium  conditions  for
the full model.
Also of interest  in the sub-model  of the urban  firm  is the dependence  of the indirect  (maximum)
profit function  (14)  on the level  of public  infrastructure.  The partial  derivative  of this function with
respect to I gives the marginal  profit to the individual  firm due to incremental  outlays on public
infrastructure  -- in effect,  a private  firm's demand  function  for public  infrastructure.  The individual
firm's willingness-to-pay  for public  infrastructure  is given  by the expression: 6
dfnI/et = P[ Px  C(I+D  b++d+P  I Z4
6 Z7  Z 6() ]  l/( 1-E))(15)
This willingness  to pay is positive  but decreases  with I (i.e.,  n2fl*/I12  < 0) if (6+6+)+p) < 1.
Finally, it should  be noted  that the number  of urban  firms (Nf) is assumed  to be endogenously
determined  by the condition:  fl* - rI = 0.  If equilibrium  profits  in the urban sector (Tl*)  are belovw
some "outside  norm" (fi), determined  perhaps by investment  opportunities  in world financial
markets,  firms will dissolve  their capital  and exit the domestic  market. This capital flight tends to
reduce the supply  of domestic  output and the demand for urban labor and urban nonresidental
space. Exit continues  until the  resulting  increase  in domestic  product  price and decreases  in factor
prices restore  the  profits  of remaining  firms  to the outside  norm.
Rural  households play a rather passive role in this predominantly  urban  model. The total
number of households  in the economy  is fixed (N), but the urban/rural  composition  (Nu and Nr =
N-Nu) is endogenous. Rural sector activities  are assumed  to provide  a fixed level of utility (1U),
which in turn depends  on income  per household  in the rural sector (Yr) and various forms of rural
public assistance  (Ar). If the common  level of utility (U*)  enjoyed  by urban households  (given by
the  indirect utility function) exceeds U, rural-to-urban migration occurs, bidding up  urban
residential  and commodity  prices  and driving  urban  wages  down  until the difference  between urban
6  The aggregate  demand  for infiastructure  is obtained by vertically  summing these individual  marginal profit
ftinctions  (assuiming  I is noncongestible);  congestion  effects  will reduce this total willingness-to-pay.A-7
and rural utility  levels vanishes. The opposite occurs if urban utility levels fall below U.  In this
model, then,  the rural sector  serves  primarily  as a potential  (but finite) source  of urban  population
change, with the equilibrium  link between  rural and urban utility levels  endogenously  determining
the rural/urban  distribution  of population. In evaluating  investments in infrastructure  or other
public goods,  it is important  to consider  the potential  effects  of such investments  on the distribution
of population  and labor between the urban  and rural sectors. This limited portrayal  of the rural
sector  provides  the necessary  mechanism,  without  unduly  complicating  the model.
Government  has a variety of policy  instruments:  current expenditures  on infrastructure  (I),
training (T) and a consumption-oriented  pubic good (G); and tax rates on wages (tw), domestic
consumption  (tx) and both residential  and nonresidential  space (ts). The more complete  form of
the model requires government  to select an instrument  mix, subject to the restriction  that total
public expenditures  including  rural assistance  (I+T+G+Ar)  less total endogenous  revenues from
wage, consumption  and property  taxes,  and exogenous  revenues  from  other miscellaneous  sources
(M) and external  assistance  (E) not exceed some specified  (perhaps  zero) deficit target (D).  The
model can be used to explore a variety of govemment objectives, including:  maximization  of
domestic output (or  output per  capita, since  population of  the  economy is  exogenous);
maximization  of the aggregate  demand for labor by urban firms; maximization  of the efficiency
wage; or even  some  weighted  welfare  function  of these altemative  goals. Altering  the government
objective  obviously  will affect  the optimal  mix of instruments.
Government  is assumed  to:
Maximize  Q(I,T,G,tw,ts,tx)  + W  I Nu[twwl*  + txpxx* + tsPsrsr*l
+Nftspsnsn*+M+D+E  -Ar-I-T-G),  (16)
where n is the general objective  function of the govermment,  W is a Lagrange  multiplier,  M is
miscellaneous  revenues from sources  other than wage, sales and property taxes, D is the current
deficit  (debt-funded  revenue),  E is the level of extemnal  assistance,  Ar is rural public  assistance,A-8
and 1*,  x*, sr*, sn* are given  by the earlier  behavioral  functions  from the household  and producer
choice problems. Note that these  imbedded  behavioral  functions  are sensitive  to the governmentes
choice of spending  levels and tax rates, making the government's  objective function a rather
complex  expression,  even though several  elements  of govemment  behavior  (M,D,E,Ar)  are taken
as exogenous  in this form of the model.
General  equilibrium  in  this model incorporates not only the optimizing behavior of
individual  agents (households,  firms, and government),  but also clearance  of several  key markets
(domestic  product, urban labor, and urban space).  Population  distribution  is determined  by the
earlier mentioned  equilibrium  condition  between  urban  and rural  levels  of household  utility,  and the
number  of urban  firms is determined  by a similar  condition  requiring  equilibrium  profits to equal
some level available  from other forms of private investment. Direct  endogenous  variables  of the
model  include:  the efficiency  wage;  prices  of the domestic  product  and urban  space (separate  prices
for  residential and  nonresidential space if  allowable-use zoning is  incorporated); public
expenditures  on infrastructure,  training, and a consumption-oriented  public good; tax rates on
wages, consumption and property;  and numbers of urban households,  rural households,  and
urban firms.
General equilibrium  requires simultaneous  solution  of a system of  14 nonlinear equations.
These conditions  include:  the 7 first-order  conditions  defining  the government's  optimal behavior
(one for each of the 6 fiscal instruments  and for the Lagrange variable, ip); market clearance
conditions  for the domestic  product,  urban labor, nonresidential  space,  residential  space;  equality
of urban and rural utility levels; equality of domestic profits and the "outside  norm;" and an
"adding  up" constraint  on population. The fourteen  primary endogenous  variables in this system
are:
Px:  domestic  product  price
w:  efficiency  wage
Psn:  price  of nonresidential  urban  spaceA-9
Psr:  price of residential  urban  space
Nf  number  of urban  firms
Nu:  number  of urban  households
Nr:  number  of rural households
I:  public  expenditures  on infrastructure
T:  public  expenditures  on training  (human  resources)
G:  expenditures  on consumption-oriented  public  goods
tw:  tax rate on wage  earnings
ts:  tax rate  on urban  space  (residential  and nonresidential)
tx:  tax rate on consumption  of the domestic  product
ip:  marginal  contribution  of external  assistance  (E) to the
specified  objective  of government  (Ql).
Once determined,  equilibrium  values of these endogenous  variables may be substituted  back
into behavioral  functions  of the submodels  to obtain  an even  more  complete  profile  of the economy
(secondary  endogenous  variables  include consumption  patterns of the urban household, factor
demands and output level of the  urban firm, source-specific  revenues of  govemment, etc.).
Changes  in any of the parameters  of the model  will generally  result in new equilibrium  values  of
both primary  and secondary  endogenous  variables.
Empirical  forms  are motivated by this general equilibrium  model.  While a variety of
reduced  form equations  are implied  by the model,  the ones  of particular  interest  to the present  study
are  those associated with government expenditures  on  infrastructure (I),  human capital or
"training"  (T), and consumption-oriented  public  goods (G). Any parameter  or exogenous  variable
of the model  potentially  appears  in each of these reduced  forrn equations. Of particular  interest  to
this study are three classes  of exogenous  variables: (1) a vector  of characteristics  (V) defining  the
particular  economy;  (2) measures  of the level and composition  of external  assistance  (E); and (3)
variables  which might reflect government  priorities  or objectives  (0).  Detailed descriptions  of
dependent  and independent  variables  are provided  in the text.Policy Research Working Paper Series
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